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hailed as the "highest safeguard of liberty."1 the writ of habeas

corpus has a revered place among our institutions. It has a notable
history,2 but its origins were humble and held little promise of distinction. Early forms of the writ were used to transfer custody of persons
held on civil process from one court to another to aid the administration
of justice.3 In this role habeas corpus was merely a weapon in legal
controversies between private individuals and in jurisdictional disputes
among various courts. Eventually one of the ancillary forms, the writ of
habeas corpus cum causa, by which a person being sued in an inferior
court had his body and the cause removed into a higher court, evolved
into what we know and hail as "the Great Writ."
But the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to
the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption
and detention, ad faciendum, subjiciendum, et recipiendum,
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The research assistance of Thomas
E. Cahill and David L. Paulsen, third-year students at the Law School, is gratefully
acknowledged.
1 E.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
2 Noteworthy discussions include CHURCH, HABEAS CoaPus 2-30 (1884); Cohen, Habeas
Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ, 18 CAN. B. REv. 10, 172
(1940); Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Common Law, 39 L.Q. REv. 46 (1923);
9 HOLDSWORTH, HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 104 (4th ed. 1927); Jencks, The Story of
Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REV. 64 (1902), reprinted in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 531 (1908); WALKER,THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEvELoP-

MENT OF HABEAS CoRpus AS THE WRIT OF LmRTY (1960); Remarks on the Writ of
Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, and the Practice Connected Therewith, 54 LAw MAG.
278 (Nov. 1855), also printed in 3 Amt. L. REG. 193 (1856). For an excellent judicial
discussion of the history see Williamson v. Lewis, 39 Pa. 9 (1861). A good summary of
habeas corpus procedure appears in 1 CHrrrIY, CRIMINAL LAw 118-32 (4th Am. ed.
1841). Typical forms are set out in CHURCH, HABEAs CoRPus 631 et seq. (1884).
3 Ad respondendum (to remove a prisoner confined by process of an inferior court
to charge him with an action in the court above); ad satisfaciendum (to remove a
prisoner to charge him with execution in the court above); ad faciendum et recipiendum,
sometimes called cum causa (to remove a cause and a prisoner from an inferior
court to the courts in Westminster); ad prosequendum, testificandum, or deliberandum
(to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute or testify in an action or to be tried in the
proper jurisdiction) 3 B.AcKSrONE, COMMENTARIES *129-31 (Am. ed. 1832); 3 CoMYNs,
Dxrsr 453-62 (1785).
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to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge
or court
4
awarding such writ shall consider in that behalf.
In this highest use the writ of habeas corpus was a "writ of right": it
issued immediately upon showing (usually by affidavit) of a prima facie
case for its issuance. 5 When employed against the crown and its officers
in its fully developed form to elicit the cause for an individual's imprisonment and to ensure that he was released, admitted to bail, or promptly
tried, the writ of habeas corpus ad subiiciendum won its place as the
most important safeguard of personal liberty.
Today the writ of habeas corpus is still in the mainstream of the law.
Its momentum is unchecked, but its direction has changed. Except in
respect to controversies over child custody 6 and commitment to mental
institutions 7 habeas corpus has ceased to be a significant remedy in civil
litigation. Its most important contemporary function is still that of
challenging the legality of official restraints on liberty, but even in this
familiar area the writ has departed from its history. At common law
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131 (Am. ed. 1832). One early statute referring to
this writ calls it "the writ of liberty." Act of Feb. 10, 1807, ALA. DIGEST OF LAws 660
(Toulmin 1823). A noteworthy definition of the writ is contained in article 791 of the
Louisiana Code of Practice in Civil Cases 134 (1839): "The habeas corpus is an order
in writing, issued in the name of the State by a judge of competent jurisdiction, and
directed to a person who has another in his custody or detains him in confinement,
commanding him to bring before the judge the person thus detained, at the time and
place appointed, and to state the reasons for which he thus keeps him imprisoned and
deprived of liberty."
5 1 CHrITY, CRIMINAL LAw 123-24 (4th Am. ed. 1841); DICEY, LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION
211 (6th ed. 1902); Goddard, The Prerogative Writs, 32 N.Z.L.J. 199, 214 (1956); Sim's
Case, 61 Mass. 285, 291-93 (1851) (Shaw, C.J.); Passimore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9,
15-17 (1855). Habeas corpus was not a writ "of course," which a court was bound to
grant without any showing. Ibid.
The legal issues were argued on the "return" to the writ, a written explanation of
the causes for the prisoner's detention. Where the writ had been issued under the
provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act the prisoner was usually brought before the
court on the return, unless he was in a class clearly not entitled to the writ. 1 CHrrY,
id. at 126. Legal questions connected with the return are discussed in CHURCH,
HABEAS CORPUS ch. XI (1884). Prior to statutory changes early in the Nineteenth
Century, there were rarely any factual issues at the hearing on the return, since the
petitioner was not allowed to contradict the respondent's return to the writ. CHURCH,
HABEAS CORPUS § 166 (1884); HuRD, HABEAS CORPUS 263-77 (1858).
Early in the Nineteenth Century English and American courts began to resolve
habeas corpus cases by issuing a rule to show cause (rule nisi) why the writ should not
issue or by hearing the legal issues on a motion for the writ. This was done as an
administrative convenience to obviate the necessity for producing the prisoner where
this was difficult or unnecessary. Cox v. Hakes, [1890] 15 App. Cas. 506, 509; Goddard,
supra, at 214; Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States
Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 153, 189 (Kurland ed.)
6 JACOBS & GOEBEL, CASES ON Dom STlc RELATIONS 882 (4th ed. 1961).
7 AMERCAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DIsABLED AND THE LAw 129, 137-41
(Lindman & McIntyre eds. 1961).

1965]

HABEAS CORPUS IN THE STATES

and under the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 16798 the use of the Great
Writ against official restraints was simply to ensure that a person was
not held without formal charges and that once charged he was either
bailed or brought to trial within a specified time. If a prisoner was held
by a valid warrant or pursuant to the execution or judgment of a proper
court, he could not obtain release by habeas corpus. In contrast, the
modem writ of habeas corpus frequently issues from federal courts to
review the decisions of state courts in matters relating to the conduct
of completed criminal trials. The question in these federal habeas corpus
proceedings is not whether the prisoner is held by a formally valid process, but whether the state court that entered the judgment of conviction
committed egregious error in reaching its judgment. In short, the writ of
habeas corpus is still serving as a weapon in jurisdictional disputes between competing legal systems, but the original role of merely bringing
the prisoner before the court for the purposes of furthering its business
has been supplanted by a new function-reviewing the proceedings of
the committing court with a view to possible invalidation of its
judgment.
The sequence of events that lead to this modem use of the writ is set
forth in the abundant literature on the federal writ of habeas corpus. 9
Although the federal constitution and statutes contain detailed provisions on habeas corpus, the leading federal decisions have relied heavily
on history and on the common law. Chief Justice Marshall set the
precedent in an important early case by declaring that "for the meaning
of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the
8 31 Car. 2, c.2 (1679).
9 E.g., Hearings on HR. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-113 (1955) (statements by Conference of
Chief Justices); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HA-lv. L. REv. 441 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State
Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Hart, ForwardThe Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HA.v. L. REV. 84,
101-25 (1959); Pollak, Proposals to Curtail FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YArE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960);
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 H-Lv. L.
REv. 1315 (1961); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAI-~v. L. REV.
1 (1956); Note, 55 CoLUM. L. RFv. 196 (1955); Note, 85 CoLuM. L. REv. 404 (1935); Note,
61 HAv. L. Rlv. 657 (1948); Note, 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958); Symposium on Habeas
Corpus and Post Conviction Review, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1964).
For earlier discussions consult CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS ch. VII (1884); Dobie,
Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 13 VA. L. Rv. 433 (1927); Thompson, Abuses
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 6 A.B.A. RPs. 243 (1883), reprinted in 18 Am. L. REv.
1 (1884); Report of the Committee on Jurisprudenceand Law Reform on Abuses of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 A.B.A. REPs. 12-44 (1884).
For a discussion of one area of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction frequently invoked
by laymen but almost totally unfamiliar to lawyers, see Oaks, supra note 5.
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common law ... "10 A hundred and fifty-six years later history was still

of such significance that the majority opinion in a leading habeas corpus
case declared that the Court could not answer the question posed "without a preliminary inquiry into the historical development of the writ
of habeas corpus.""
Judicial opinions that claim guidance from habeas corpus history have
normally relied on developments in England in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries.12 While the importance of these developments is
ample justification for close scrutiny, the Supreme Court's frequent reexamination of this period is perhaps also attributable to the work of
several distinguished scholars who have illuminated the subject and
made its principal events comparatively accessible.
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has rarely considered
the more recent history of the writ of habeas corpus in our own state
courts and legislatures. Although comparatively little has been written
about this subject it is not lacking in importance. Prior to the Civil War
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was so limited that almost all of the
habeas corpus litigation in this country was in the state courts. In drawing precedents or lessons from the history or common law of habeas
corpus modem courts should not overlook the constitutional, statutory
and case-law developments in the various states in this period.
To supply one introduction to such an examination this article will
discuss the uses and history of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum' n in the several states during the period from the Revolution
through the 1860's,14 considering the constitutional, statutory, and
judicial antecedents of the law. 15
10 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
11 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
12 E.g., McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
13 This study is limited to the ad subjiciendum form of the writ although other,
ancillary, forms were also in common use during this period. The -most familiar of
these was the writ of habeas corpus cum causa. E.g., Taylor v. Llewellin, 1 Harris &
McHenry 19 (Md. 1692); Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Vannatta, 17 N.J.L. 159
(1839); Austin v. Nelson, 6 N.J.L. 381 (1797); Snowden v. Roberts, 4 Cow. 69 (N.Y.
1825); Bell v. Hall, 12 Johns. R. 152 (N.Y. 1815); Vosburgh v. Rogers, 8 Johns. R. 91
(N.Y. 1811); Benner v. Oberlander, I Bin. 366 (Pa. 1808); Fleming v. Bradley, 5 Call
203 (Va. 1797); Judicial Org. Act § 3, Judicial Reg. Act § 39, 3 Onio STATS. 1671-1678,
(1830); An act for Establishing a General Court, § 53, 9 VA. STAT. 414 (Hening 1775).
The statutes also mention the ad testificandum. E.g., 2 N.Y. Rav. STAT. 559 (1828);
Ar-A. DiG. 410 (Clay 1843).
14 The Civil War was chosen as the cut-off point because it marked the end of what
had been almost exclusive state habeas corpus jurisdiction over persons imprisoned by
state authority. The modem era of habeas corpus was initiated by the statutes,
constitutional amendments, and judicial decisions of the Reconstruction, which gave
the federal courts their first broad authority to issue the writ for state prisoners,
enlarged their scope of review, and promulgated the constitutional doctrines necessary

HABEAS CORPUS IN THE STATES
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Unlike other treasured rights like trial by jury or the right of confrontation, which were expressly guaranteed in each of the original state constitutions,16 the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was transmitted
into American law principally through tradition and the common law.
Only three of the twelve original states that had written constitutions
in the first decade of our national existence included any mention of the
writ. These constitutions guaranteed the privilege affirmatively: North
Carolina by a declaration that every freeman is entitled to a remedy to
inquire into and remove unlawful restraints of his liberty (habeas corpus
not mentioned),1 7 Georgia by a declaration that the principles of the
habeas corpus act should be part of its constitution, 8 and Massachusetts
by the following provision:
The privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus shall be
enjoyed in this commonwealth, in the most free, easy, cheap,
expeditious, and ample manner, and shall not be suspended by
the legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding twelve months.' 9
In 1784 New Hampshire adopted a new constitution embodying the
Massachusetts provision (but with a three-month limitation). 20 Thus,
when the constitutional convention met in Philadelphia in 1787 there
were four states with habeas corpus guarantees in their constitutions,
eight with none, and one state (Rhode Island) without a written constitution.
for the broad control over criminal processes that federal habeas corpus courts have
come to exert in our own day. 14 Stat. 385 (1867); U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV. E.g., Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
15 An effort has been made to locate and examine all of the state constitutional
provisions, all of the significant state legislation, and all of the important state decisions
concerning the writ of habeas corpus ad subficiendum during the pre-Civil War period.
However, the relative infrequency with which these early courts cited prior decisions
in reaching their judgments, the scarcity of legal periodicals, and the dearth of early
citations in the normal reference materials of legal research all suggest that significant
sources have escaped notice.
16 PouND, THE DEVELOPMIENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LmERTY 85 (1957).
Cf. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1030, 1055-57 (1964) (appendix of early state provisions
on constitutional right to counsel).
17 N.C. CONST. art. XIII (1776). All of the state constitutional provisions cited
herein may be found in I or 2 PooRE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTIrToNs, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAws (2d ed. 1878).

18 GA. CONST. art. LX (1777).
19 MASS. CONST. c.6, art. VII (1780).
20 N.H. CONST. (unnumbered provision) (1784).
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Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who called the writ of habeas corpus "the most
important human rights provision in the Constitution," 21 contended
that the writ was omitted from most early state constitutions not because
it was thought unimportant, but because "it had been so long and solidly
established in every colony that assertion was probably considered unnecessary." 22 The fact that considerably less than half of the original
state constitutions specifically guaranteed other important rights such as
the right to counsel 23 and the privileges against self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure supports Chafee's inference that omitted matters were not necessarily thought unimportant. Other history
-notably that involving suspension of the writ, cited hereafter-casts
doubt upon the conclusion that the right to habeas corpus was so solidly
established that constitutional guarantees were considered unnecessary.
The draft federal constitution first reported by the Committee of
Detail contained no habeas corpus provision. 24 Among various proposals
thereafter submitted to the committee by Mr. Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina was a habeas corpus provision in substantially the same form
as that in the Massachusetts constitution. 25 After some debate Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania moved that:
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.26
This version, which remains unchanged today as article I, section 9,
clause 2 of our federal constitution, was approved unanimously up to
the word "unless," but three colonies voted against the remaining
language (the vote was 7-3) because of their contention that the
privilege should never be suspended.27 The record discloses no concern
that the federal constitution made no express grant of the habeas corpus
privilege whose suspension it forbade. It seems to have been assumed
21 Chafee, The Most I7nportant Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L.
REv. 143, 144 (1952).
.22Ibid.
23 POUND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 86-87, 89.
24 5 ELLIoT's DEBATES 376-81 (2d ed. 1845); Hu"a,
HABEAS CoRpus 123 (1858);
Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40
CAulF. L. REv. 335, 341 et seq. (1952).
25 5 ELLIOT'S DFBATES 445, 484 (2d ed. 1845).
26 Id. at 484. This provision was generally similar to the following provision
suggested in a draft submitted to the convention by Mr. Charles Pinckney on May 29,
1787, some months before the report of the Committee of Detail: "nor shall the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or
invasion." Id. at 131; id. at 185.
27 Id. at 484. The dissenting states were Georgia, North Carolina and South
Carolina.
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either that the right to the writ was conferred by implication in the
anti-suspension provision or that it existed under the common law in
28
force in the several states.
The habeas corpus provision in the federal constitution was soon
copied by the constitution-makers in the thirteen original states and in
the new states admitted to the union thereafter. By 1844 five of the eight
states that had been without habeas corpus provisions originally, plus
Rhode Island (which finally adopted a constitution in 1842) and Georgia
(which relinquished its dause conferring the right affirmatively) had
adopted provisions patterned after the federal one.29 Massachusetts,
New Hampshire and North Carolina retained their original provisions
conferring the right and (except for North Carolina) prohibiting its
suspension. Virginia had no provision concerning the writ until its new
constitution of 1830, which provided that "The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not in any case be suspended."3 0 The remaining two
states, Maryland and South Carolina, added habeas corpus provisions to
31
their constitutions after the Civil War.
All twenty-one of the new states admitted after 1787 and prior to
1860, with the sole exception of Vermont, wrote into their constitutions
a habeas corpus provision practically (and in most cases exactly) identical
to the federal provision. 32 None made any affirmative guarantee of the
writ, an unusual circumstance in view of a succession of federal enactments declaring that the inhabitants of these new areas were to have
the benefits of the writ.3 It was apparently assumed by the new states
28 RAWLE, A VIEw OF THE CONSTrrUTION 118 (2d ed. 1829). See generally Collings,
supra note 24, at 341-45; Oaks, supra note 5, at 155-56. The Supreme Court recently
cited article I, § 9 in support of this statement: "The habeas corpus jurisdictional
statute implements the constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made
available." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)(dictum).
29 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1818); DEL. CoNsr. art. I, § 13 (1792); GA. CONST. art.
IV, § 9 (1798); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1844); N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1821); PA.
CONSr. art. IX, § 14 (1790); R.I. CoNsr. art. I, § 9 (1842).
30 VA. CoNs'r. art. III, § 11 (1830).

III, § 55 (1867); S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 17 (1868).
ALA. CoNsT. art. I, § 17 (1819); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 18 (1836); CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 5 (1849); FLA. CONsr. art. I, § 11 (1838); ILL. CONsT. art. VIII, § 13 (1818); IND.
CONST. art. I, § 14 (1816); IowA CONST. art. I, § 13 (1846); KAN. CONs-r. art. I, § 8
(1855); Ky. CONSr. art. XII (1792); LA. COts. art. 6, § 19 (1812); ME. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 10 (1820); MICH. CoNsr. art. I, § 12 (1835); MINN. CONSr. art. I, § 7 (1857); Miss. CoNSr.
art. I, § 17 (1817); Mo. CONsr. art. XIII, § 11 (1820); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 12
(1802); ORE. CONSr. art. I, § 24 (1857); TENN. CONsr. art. XI, § 15 (1796); TEX. CONSr.
art. I, § 10 (1845); WIS. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (1848).
The federal provision was also embodied in the Constitution of the Confederate
States of America, art. I, § IX, c. 3.GA. CODE p. 982 (1861).
33 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided in art. II that "The inhabitants of
the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writs of habeas
31 MD. CoNsT. art.
32
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that the federal-style provision forbidding suspension of the writ sufficed
to guarantee its availability, and Congress seems to have acquiesced in
that assumption.
Vermont, the single deviation from the general pattern, had no habeas
corpus provision until its constitutional amendment in 1836, 34 which
followed in substance the 1830 Virginia formulation that the writ of
habeas corpus should never be suspended. No other states adopted this
absolute prohibition against suspension in pre-Civil War times, but it
became quite popular thereafter. Doubtless as a result of the experiences
of that troubled time, particulaily the furor over President Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus,3 5 seven states adopting constitutions during
the period between 1865 and 1876 included provisions absolutely prohibiting suspension of the writ. 36 In addition, one other state adopted
for the first time the federal formula forbidding suspension except in
37
certain circumstances.
Like the federal constitution, most state constitutions were silent on
who could suspend the writ in the prescribed circumstances. The Massachusetts-New Hampshire formulation expressly conferred this power on
the legislature, as did variations of the federal provision adopted in
Connecticut and Rhode Island- in 1818 and 1842, respectively. 38 Florida's
1868 constitution and an 1858 South Carolina statute were unique in
granting the suspension power to the Governor.3 9 The silence on this
subject in the remaining state constitutions, including those adopted in
the two decades following 1860, was probably the result of a general
consensus that the suspension power resided in the legislature. Such was
the effect of Chief Justice Taney's famous opinion in Ex Parte Merryman40 on President Lincoln's celebrated suspension of the writ. In addicorpus .....
Section 3 of the 1811 Enabling Act for Louisiana provided that its
constitution "shall secure to -the citizen ... the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
conformable to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States .... " Section
14 of the 1812 Act creating the Territorial Government of Missouri provided in
section 14 that "The people of the said Territory shall always be entitled to ... the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus." I PooRE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 431, 699; 2
PooRE, id. at 1100.
VT. CONsT. art. XII (1836).
35 See Collings, supra note 24, at 341 n.33.
38 ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 18 (1875); LA. CONsT. art. I, § 7 (1868); MD. CONsT. art. III,
§ .55 (1867); MO. CONST. art. II, § 26 (1875); N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 21 (1868); TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (1876); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1872).
37 S. C. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1868).
38 CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 14 (1818); R.I. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (1842).
39 FLA. CONsT. art. VI, § 21 (1868); S.C. REv. STAT. cl. 132, § 18 (1872).
40 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861). The question of suspension is
34

discussed in CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS

§§

50-57 (1884).
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tion, in each of at least six recorded instances where the writ was suspended during or before the War for Independence, this power was
41
exercised by the legislature and not by the executive.
II.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Virtually all American habeas corpus legislation had its genesis in the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, but more than a century elapsed
before the provisions of that act became generally applicable on this
side of the Atlantic. Originally the Crown took the position that the
1679 act did not apply to the colonies, and in the two decades before
1700 the Privy Council annulled attempts by the colonies of Massachu42
setts, New York and Pennsylvania to legislate its terms into effect.
After 1710 the policy changed and the royal governors in Virginia and
North and South Carolina issued Proclamations extending the colonial
subjects' right to petition for the writ of habeas corpus.4 3 Nevertheless,
only one state, South Carolina, seems to have had a habeas corpus act at
44
the time of the Declaration of Independence.
It is surprising that lawmakers in the colonies and later in the original
thirteen states apparently had no sense of urgency about enacting habeas
corpus legislation. Only Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania
and Virginia had passed habeas corpus acts by 1787.45 Delaware and
New Jersey joined this group in the 1790's,46 but it was not until many
years later that acts were passed in Connecticut (1821), Maryland
41 Massachusetts during Shay's Rebellion, 1786-87, HuD, HABEAS CoRus 136 (1858);
New York and Pennsylvania with respect to certain individuals in 1770 and 1758,
respectively, LmvY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 55, 85 (1960); New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Virginia, at certain times during the War for Independence, INDEX TO
NEW JERSEY LAWS 391 (Hood 1877); 4 S.C. STAT. 458 (1838); 10 LAWS or VA. 413-14
(Hening 1822).
See Oaks, supra note 5, at 160 for a discussion of the Jefferson Administration's
attempt (successful in the Senate) to have the writ suspended in 1807 in connection with
the alleged Burr conspiracy.
42 WALxER,

THE AMERICAN

RECEPI1ON OF THE WRIT or LIBERTY

10-18

(1961);

Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 Amx. His. REv. 18 (1902); HURD,
HABEAS CORPUS 109-20 (1858). See generally BROWN, BRMSH STATrUTES IN AmucA
LAW, 1776-1836, ch. 1 (1964).
43 Ibid.

44 Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C. STAT. 399 (Cooper 1837). Chafee, supra note 21, at 146
says that all the colonial charters were silent about habeas corpus.
45 GA. CoNsr. art. LX (1777) (incorporates Habeas Corpus Act); 1 MAss. GEN. LAws

ch. 71 (1784); Act of Feb. 21, 1787, N.Y. Laws 1785-88, 424 (Official Reprint 1886); Act
of Feb. 18, 1785, PA. GEN. LAWS 142 (Dunlop, 2d ed. 1849); Act of 1784, 11 LAws OF
VA. 408 (Hening 1823).
46 Act of Feb. 2, 1793, DEL. LAWS 294 (Rev. ed. 1829); Act of Mar. 11, 1795, N.J.
REv. LAWS 193 (1820).
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(1809), New Hampshire (1815), North Carolina (1836), and Rhode
47
Island (1822).
The dose conformity of most state legislation to the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679 requires a brief summary of that act.4 8 The writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the Great Writ, evolved out of the
common law, and was used long before the legislation of 1679. That
statute was merely supplementary and remedial. Its substantive provisions
only applied to persons who were committed or detained for criminal
or supposed criminal matters, and even as to those its primary benefits
were not available to persons committed for "felony or treason plainly
expressed in the warrant of commitment," or to "persons convict or in
execution by legal process.. ." (§ 3).
The act's inapplicability to civil imprisonments was assured by a
provision that its terms did not extend "to discharge out of prison any
person charged in debt, or other action, or with process in any civil
cause... " (§ 8). Finally, the remedy authorized by the act was simply to
"discharge the said prisoner from his imprisonment, taking his or their
recognizance, with one or more surety or sureties . . . for his or their
appearance in the Court of King's bench the term following . . ." (§ 3).

The act conferred no power to discharge the prisoner absolutely, except
where he was indicted and not tried within the prescribed time. 49 Plainly,
the benefits of this famous English act were intended primarily for
individuals detained for a crime but held without a warrant of commitment, or for individuals held without bail upon a warrant charging a
minor offense.
The principal new substantive right created by the 1679 act was the
power it gave selected judicial officers to issue the writ of habeas corpus
"in the vacation time, and out of term" (§ 3), when the common-law writ
of habeas corpus (which could only be issued by a court in session) had
previously been unavailable. 0 The act also effected numerous reforms
in the procedure governing habeas corpus generally. It required that
47 An Act to Provide for Issuing the Writ of Habeas Corpus, CONN. COMP. LAWS
265 (1821); Act of 1809, 1 MD.LAws 568 (Dorsey 1840); Act of June 26, 1815, 2 N.H.
LAws 11 (1815-21); An act for the better security of personal liberty, 1 N.C. Ray.
STAT. 814 (1836-37); Act of 1822, R.I. Laws, 1822, p. 180.
48 31 Car. 2, c.2 (1679), discussed in WALKm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 79-85; Cohen,
supra note 2, at 172, 185-96; 1 CHnrrY, CsIUmnAL LAw 121-22 (4th Am. ed. 1841).
49 HuRD, HABAs CoRsus 417 (1858).
50 COKE, INsrrrmis, Pt. II, p. 53 and Pt. IV, p. 81; 9 Hou swoTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 115-16 (1926). After an earlier decision -to the contrary, it was finally
held that Chancery could issue the common-law writ during vacation. Crowley's
Case [1818] 2 Swan. 1. The English Act also removed certain existing doubts about
the jurisdiction and powers of certain courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus by a
broad grant of such jurisdiction to the High Court of Chancery, the Court of
Exchequer, and the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas (§ 10).
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jailers make return to such writs within three days (if the commitment
was within twenty miles of the place of return), and that the respondent
certify the true causes of imprisonment (§ 2). It imposed a civil penalty
in favor of the aggrieved prisoner: (a) on officers who neglected or
refused to make the proper return or who refused the prisoner's request
to furnish him with a copy of his warrant of commitment (2 100), (b)
on any person who should move a prisoner from the prison and custody
to which he was originally committed except by habeas corpus or some
other legal writ or cause (£100), (c) on any judicial officer who in
vacation refused any writ that the act required be granted (P 500), and
(d) on any person who should knowingly reimprison for the same
offense any person previously set at large by habeas corpus (P 500)
(§§ 5, 6, 9, 10). The act also prohibited sending persons to foreign
prisons (§ 12). Finally, the right to a speedy trial was enforced by the
requirement that persons committed for felony or treason (to whom
the habeas corpus provisions did not apply) who were not indicted
during the term following their commitment should be bailed, and if
not indicted and tried in the second term should be discharged (§ 7).
Each of the foregoing procedural reforms unquestionably identifies
various means that had previously been used to prevent suitors from
obtaining the benefits of the common law writ of habeas corpus, 51 and
they were held to apply to the common law as well as to the statutory
forms of the writ.52 By describing and stigmatizing these abuses of the
common-law writ and by providing a comparable statutory remedy during vacation, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 won its place as a landmark
of liberty.
With the sole exception of Connecticut, which passed its own unique
habeas corpus statute in 1821, all of the habeas corpus acts passed in
the thirteen original colonies or states were patterned after the English
act. Although this legislation invariably duplicated the procedural
reforms in the English act, the degree to which the exact terms were
copied varied from the modernized provisions of Massachusetts to the
verbatim copies in Georgia and South Carolina, which followed the
English version so slavishly that the only officers authorized to issue the
writ in vacation were the "lord chancellor or lord keeper, or any one of
his majesty's justices, either of the one bench or of the other, or the
barons of the exchequer of the degree of the coif . . . ."5 These- two
op. cit. supra note 2, at
51 1 CHrrr, op. cit. supra note 48, at 119-21; WALKE,
79-85; Cohen, supra note 2, at 183-84; Chafee, supra note 21, at 148-49.
52 HuRw, HABE:As CoRius 208 (1858).

The quoted language is from section 3 of the English Act, adopted verbatim in
CONsT. art. LX (1777); Act of Oct. 16, 1692, 2 S.C. STAT.
74 (Cooper 1837).
53

these two jurisdictions. GA.
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states apparently, had to enact supplementary legislation to empower
their own judicial officers to exercise the powers created by the act.54
Although patterned after the English act, the scope of the state statutes
differed in three important respects: (1) the type of commitments for
which the writ would issue, (2) whether issuance of the writ was authorized generally or only during vacation, and (3) what courts or judicial
officers were authorized to exercise the powers created. 55
The legislation in the twelve original states that followed the English
act was uniform in providing that the benefits of the act should not
extend to persons properly charged with felony or treason or to "persons
convict" or in execution under civil or criminal process. However, the
statutes were not uniform on whether they authorized issuance of the
writ for those illegally held without process. Like the English act, the
legislation in Georgia, New Jersey, New York (prior to 1818),56 South
Carolina and Virginia (prior to 1815) 57 was only applicable to persons
committed on criminal process. The remaining states, doubtless influenced by the liberal provisions of the legislation enacted in Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania at a very early date, and by similar provisions in an
1816 English act,58 phrased their habeas corpus legislation to apply to
all persons restrained of their liberty for any cause or upon any pretense
whatever.
Another substantive difference lay in whether the state legislation
merely authorized issuance of the writ by judges during vacation, like
the English act, or whether it also empowered certain courts or judges
to award the writ during term. 59 The legislative authority in Georgia,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York (prior to 1818), North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia (prior to 1815) was limited to confinement while
54 Act of Feb. 16, 1799, GA. DIGEsT 206 (Prince 1822); Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C.
STAT.

399 (Cooper 1837).

55 Unless otherwise noted, the two paragraphs next following in the text refer

to the original state habeas corpus acts cited in notes 45-47 supra.
56 N.Y. LAWS 298 (1818).
57 Act of Jan. 10, 1815, VA. Acrs 1814, ch. XXVI (1815).
58 56 Geo. III ch. 100 (1816).
59 There were no constitutional provisions specifying which courts or judges could
issue the writ of habeas corpus in any of the original thirteen states except Delaware,
whose second constitution had a provision authorizing the chancellor and certain
judges to issue the writ during vacation. DEL. CONSr. art. VI, § 5 (1792). In contrast,
this subject was included in the constitutions of most of the states admitted and new
constitutions adopted after about 1820. E.g., ARtK. CONSr. art. VI, § 2 (1836); Mo.
CONsr. art. V, § 3 (1820); OHIO CONsr. art. IV, § 2 (1851). The subject was doubtless
given constitutional dignity to assure that the privilege of the writ would not be
frustrated if the legislature failed to enact legislation designating which court or
judicial officer should be empowered to issue the writ. For a discussion of comparable
ambiguities in the federal constitution in this respect, see Oaks, supra note 5, at 155-56.
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the court was not in session. These states apparently relied on the
common-law authority of their courts to redress restraints suffered during
term time.
Statutes in the remaining states, which authorized issuance of the writ
during term by courts, fit into three groups. The first group, led by
Massachusetts and including New Hampshire and Rhode Island,
authorized issuance of the writ only by the state's highest tribunal.
Pennsylvania and Delaware empowered both trial level courts and their
highest court to issue the writ. Alone in the last category was Connecticut, whose legislation authorized issuance of the writ in term or vacation
by the judges of trial-level courts of general jurisdiction.
In some jurisdictions, particularly those whose statutes were narrowly
tailored to the English pattern, the statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction
was generously supplemented by powers derived from the common law.
A court exercising common law powers could give an absolute discharge
(instead of merely admitting the petitioner to bail), and may not have
been inhibited in the exercise of this power by statutory exceptions such
as those relating to "persons convict or in execution by legal process." 6o
Courts employing such powers in habeas corpus cases included trial-level
courts in Georgia, New York (prior to the codification of its habeas
corpus law in an 1818 act), Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.' 1 Individ62
ual judges, justices or chancellors of course had no common law powers.
III. COURT DECISIONS

The state constitutions and statutes (supplemented where appropriate
by the common law) define the theoretical availability of the writ of
habeas corpus, but they do not reveal the actual uses to which the writ
was put. The best evidence of usage are the reports of court decisions.
Even this evidence must be used with caution, however. The number
of reported habeas corpus decisions is not a direct or even a relative
indication of the number of such cases decided. The volume of reports
60 HuRD, HABEAs CoRPus 417-18 (1858). Available authorities are too scarce to
conclude with certainty whether there were comparable limitations on the exercise of
common law powers. If not, those states that supplanted the common law by remedial
habeas corpus legislation drafted to apply to all forms of restraints actually narrowed
the range of protection under the writ of habeas corpus to the extent that the avail-

ability of the new statutory writ was subject to statutoryexceptions. E.g., see text accompanying note 85, infra.
61 In the Matter of Mitchell, Charlton's Rep. 489 (Ga. 1886); Bank of United States
v. Jenkins, 18 Johns. R. 305 (N.Y. 1820); In the Matter of Carlton, 7 Cow. 471 (N.Y.
1827); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1 S.& R. 353 (Pa. 1815); State v. Fasket, 5 Rich.
255 (S.C. 1851).
62 E.g., Peltier v. Pennington, 14 N.J. 812 (C.J. in Chambers 1884); In the Matter
of Goodhue, N.Y. City-H. Rec. Reports 153 (Chancery 1816).

256

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:243

depends most immediately on whether any provision was made for
reporting the decisions of the courts or judges who had the statutory
or common-law habeas corpus power. For example, where, the highest
state court had the statutory jurisdiction one would expect to find
numerous reports of decisions on habeas corpus matters. This is true of
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and also of New York, where the
exercise of common-law (and later statutory) powers by the Supreme
Court was carefully reported, although this was not then the highest
state court. 63 Similarly, one would expect few reported court decisions in
states like Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, and North and South
Carolina, where the statutory powers were vested in judges whose decisions were not usually reported and where the constitutional provisions
limiting the highest state court to "appellate jurisdiction" prevented that
court from exercising any common law habeas corpus powers.6 4 Occasional reports of the habeas corpus opinions of some Maryland judges,
and a number of sporadic reports of the habeas corpus decisions of lower
courts exercising common-law jurisdiction in Connecticut and Georgia
did give a smattering of case authority in those states.
The number and content of appellate opinions is an equally unreliable
indication of the actual extent of habeas corpus litigation and the types
of restraints for which the writ was issued. The extensive statutory jurisdiction conferred on individual judges normally was not subject to
appellate review because their orders were not the final judgments of
courts.65 In addition, the laws governing review of the action of courts
in habeas corpus matters were laden with complications that undoubtedly inhibited appellate review. 66
63 Inexplicably, there are few or no reported court decisions in Delaware, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island, where the statutory habeas corpus power was also
vested in whole or part in a court whose decisions were normally reported.
64 Norwood v. Martin, 3 H. & J. 199 (Md. 1810). The comparable limitation on the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is discussed in Oaks,
supra note 5.
65 In re Perkins, 2 Cal. 424, 430 (1852); Weddington v. Sloan, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.)
147 (1854); In the Matter of Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847). Cf. Steele v. Shirley,
17 Miss. (9 S. & M.) 382 (1848) (writ of error under statute, but no appeal).
66 The statutory remedy of appeal was available in some states to review the
exercise of common-law or statutory jurisdiction by lower courts. E.g., Clark v.
Gautier, 8 Fla. 360 (1859); Shaw v. Smith, 8 Ind. 485 (1857); Foster v. Alston,
6 How. 406 (Miss. 1842); State v. Fasket, 5 Rich. 255 (S.C. 1851); Renney v. Mayfield, 4
Hay. 165 (Tenn. 1817). However, many states either had no such legislation or
construed it to be inapplicable to review of habeas corpus matters. Bell v. Miller,
4 Gill. 301 (Md. 1846); Howe v. State, 9 Mo. 690 (1846); cases cited in Note, 45 Am.
Dec. 130, 133 (1886).
Precedents on the availability of the common-law writ of error to review habeas
corpus decisions were also highly contradictory. In the two most notable cases the
various judges on the courts were so badly divided that neither had great value as
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These observations raise serious questions about the advisability of
using the reported opinions of judges or courts as the basis for quantitative or qualitative generalizations about the extent and type of use of
the writ of habeas corpus in the several states prior to the Civil War.
These opinions are the best evidence of the content of the law in that
period, however, and each one is also irrefutable evidence of at least one
employment of the writ. In those two respects they can serve as the basis
for cautious generalization, particularly in view of the scarcity of other
relevant and available historical sources.
The reported habeas corpus cases may be classified in four groups:
(1) those where a prisoner is seeking relief from a criminal arrest or
commitment; (2) those where a prisoner is seeking relief from a civil
arrest or commitment; (3) those where an individual is seeking relief
from some restraint on his liberty that does not arise from a civil or
criminal arrest or commitment; and (4) those where some third party is
seeking to have a prisoner released from the respondent's custody so
that the third party can take custody of the prisoner himself.
precedent. Ex parte Yates, 6 Johns. R. 337 (N.Y. 1810); Holmes v. Jamison, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 273 (1840). Frequently a writ of error was used without discussion of its
propriety. E.g., Lindsey v. Lindsey, 14 Ga. 657 (1854); Hovey v. Morris, 7 Ind. 559
1845); Sam v. Fore, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 413 (1849). Most opinions that discussed the
question held the writ of error inapplicable because the petitioner's right to make
successive applications for the writ deprived habeas corpus orders of the status of
final judgments. Wade v. Judge, 5 Ala. 130 (1843); Hammond v. People, 32 Ill. 446
(1863); cases cited in Appeals and Writs of Error in Habeas Corpus Cases, 1 AM. LAw
Rr.. 513 (1853). On the problem of successive applications, consult Gordon, The Unruly
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 26 MOD. L. R v. 520 (1963). Of course this rationale had little
or no force where the lower court had discharged the prisoner (since most habeas
corpus legislation forbade his reimprisonment). Therefore, it is not surprising that
some cases that denied appellate review to refusals of relief suggested the propriety
of review if the prisoner had been released by the writ. In fact, most reported instances
where appellate jurisdiction was declined involve cases where relief was refused below,
whereas most exercises of appellate jurisdiction involved cases where the prisoner had
been discharged. Hammond v. People, 33 II. 446, 457-58, 462 (1863) (separate opinion);
Appeals and Writs of Error,supra at 516. Compare Ex parte Mitchell, 1 La. Ann. Rep.
413 (1846) (no appeal where prisoner remanded), with Dodge's Case, 6 Mart. 569 (La.
1819) (dictum) (appeal allowed where prisoner discharged); and Jones v. Timberlake,
6 Rand. 678 (Va. 1828) (no writ of error where prisoner remanded), with Ruddle's
Ex'r v. Ben, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 487 (1839) (writ of error allowed where prisoner
discharged).
A few states permitted review of certain habeas corpus judgments by mandamus or
certiorari, the former most prevalent where relief had been denied and the latter where
it had been granted. Mandamus: Ex parte Mahone, 30 Ala. 49 (1847); Wright v. Johnson, 5 Arka 687 (1844); Hyde v. Jenkins, 6 La. 427 (1834). Certiorari: Field v. Walker,
17 Ala. 80 (1849); Platt v. Harrison, 6 Iowa 79 (1858).
By the time of the Civil War the foregoing distinctions began to be erased by legislation granting generous appellate review of habeas corpus decisions, e.g., Ex parte
James Collier, 6 Ohio St. 55 (1867); Huan, HABEAs Cop'us 568 (1858), and today the
matter is only of historical interest.
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A. Criminal Arrest or Commitment
Habeas corpus cases initiated by persons charged with crimes divide
into two groups-petitions brought before and petitions brought after
judgment of conviction. This division highlights the contrast between
modem habeas corpus litigation and that common more than a century
ago. Today habeas corpus has become a remedy most frequently employed after conviction. In the Nineteenth Century, however, most
petitions involving criminal commitments preceded conviction. In fact,
many were submitted immediately upon the defendant's being arrested
and before he was even brought before a judicial officer for formal
commitment.
At the pre-indictment stage there were two principal uses of the writ.
First, it was employed to obtain the defendant's release on bail prior to
indictment or trial.6 7 This was the function that had been codified in the
Habeas Corpus Act of 167! and its legislative progeny in this country.
In determining whether to admit the petitioner to bail the habeas corpus
court would examine and be guided by the depositions upon which the
68
commitment was founded.
Second, the writ was sought to effect an absolute release from the
pending charge. Such a release, available at common law or under
remedial legislation, would result from a showing that the warrant or
writ under which the defendant was held was void. For example, in an
1854 case the writ of habeas corpus issued on the court's conclusion that
the warrant was invalid because the law whose violation was charged
was unconstitutional. 69 A more common, if less successful, attack was
based on the claim that the arrest warrant had been issued on insufficient
proof of the commission of the'named offense or of the probable guilt of
the petitioner. Following is a typical statement of the reasoning upon
which most courts rejected such grounds for issuance of the writ:
[U]pon the writ of habeas corpus we cannot look beyond the
colorable authority of the judge to issue the warralts. We cannot inquire into the technicalities, or the strict regularity of the
proceedings in any case, but rather to restore to his liberty the
citizen who is imprisoned without color of law. In these cases
we can merely look into the sheriff's return, which contains the
several warrants by virtue of which he detains the relators; and
67 In re McIntyre, 10 Ill. 422 (1849); Belgard v. Morse, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 406 (1854);
State v. Best, 7 Ind. 612 (1845); Ex parte Croom & May, 19 Ala. 561 (1851). ,
68 Cnuicum, HBEAs CoiRus §§ 390, 400 (1884); 1 CHITTY, op. cit. supra note 48, at
128-29.
69 In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 49 (1854), rev'd sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1859). This proposition later became well settled. See Note, 3 AM. & ANN.
CASES 581 (1905).

1965]

HABEAS CORPUS IN THE STATES

also into the affidavits contained in the traverse and upon which
the judge issued the warrants, so far as to see that the judge had
colorable jurisdiction of the process, and assumed to take proof
upon the issuing of the same, and which the proof he adjudged
to be sufficient, we will not, upon the writ of habeas corpus,
review his adjudication upon that question; nor undertake to
say whether he erred in adjudging the proof to be sufficient. 70
Other authorities, particularly in extradition cases, held that the habeas
corpus court could re-examine the affidavits or depositions upon which
the warrant had been issued and discharge the prisoner if they did not
furnish a proper basis for his detention. 71 An appellate court could
justify this wider scope of review by reference to the common law practice of securing review of the decisions of inferior courts by means of
the companion writs of certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa.72 One
court explained this practice as follows:
This [cum causa] form of the writ is seldom used by us now,
because it is seldom needed. It is a form of enforcing an undoubted authority over subordinate courts. But some of its principles have passed into, or naturally belong to, the administration of the common law habeas corpus ad subjiciendum;
because superior courts, in reviewing the commitments of
inferior magistrates on this latter writ, do sometimes go back
of the commitment, and inquire into the grounds of it and their
sufficiency. The power to do this comes from the fact of their
70 In re Prime, 1 Barb. 340, 349 (N.Y. 1847) (Emphasis added). Accord: In re Clark,
9 Wend. 212 (N.Y. 1832); In re Greenough, 31 Vt. 279 (1858); State v. Asselin, Charlton
Rep. 184 (Ga. 1808); see CHURCH, HABEAS CoRPUs § 234 (1884).
71 E.g., State v. Buzine, 4 Del. 472 (1846) (facts in deposition did not constitute
larceny); In re Greenough, 31 Vt. 279, 288-89 (1858) (dictum); see CHURCH, HABEAS
CoRPus § 235 (1884). A notable federal example of this use of the writ is Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
An even more searching inquiry was permitted in Ex parte Mahone, 80 Ala. 49
(1857), discussed in CHURCH, HABEAS CoRPus § 237 (1884). In that case the court held
that a prisoner committed after a preliminary examination had an absolute right
to have the court on habeas corpus "hear and pass on all legal evidence which he
offers, touching the question of his guilt. If, on such examination, 'it appear that no
offense has been committed, or that there is no probable cause for charging the
defendant therewith,' the prisoner must be discharged." 80 Ala. at 50. The language
quoted in this unusual opinion apparently came from the section of the statute
governing the discharge of defendants on preliminary hearing. ALA. CODE § 4010 (1867).
Cf. State v. Best, 7 Ind. 611 (1845).
72 1 CHrrrY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 127. As a means of review, habeas corpus and
certiorari were complementary. The former brought up the prisoner but not record; the
latter brought up the record but not the prisoner. 2 HALE, PLEAS Or THE CROWN 210
(Am. ed. 1847); Bacon, Habeas Corpus, 4 ABRDGMENT Or THE LAW 563, 587 Bll
(Bouvier ed. 1852).
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superiority, and therefore from common law, and not from the
Habeas Corpus Act.
When a court has authority to send a habeas corpus or a
certiorarito remove a cause and the record of it from an inferior
court, to be tried before them, or when they act as superior committing magistrates, they may go back into the evidence on
which the commitment is founded, and review that, because of
their jurisdiction over the inferior courts and their acts, and
because of their general superiority. Where they have no such
superiority, they cannot do it73
This passage probably explains what was meant when a Nineteenth
Century court asserted that habeas corpus and certiorari could be used
together to perform the functions of a writ of error 7 4 -a startling contradiction of the usual statement that habeas corpus cannot substitute
for an appeal or writ of error.76
After indictment prisoners were clearly less able to employ the writ
of habeas corpus to obtain bail or absolute discharge because the underlying factual basis for the indictment was not available, and any consideration of extrinsic evidence would merely be a preview of the trial
on the merits. 6 So far as bail was concerned, it will be remembered that
the bail provisions in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 did not apply to
persons who had been committed for "felony or treason plainly expressed
in the warrant of commitment." 7 7 There seems to have been a sharp
division of authority over whether this or similar language in state
legislation forbade the exercise of common law as well as statutory
habeas corpus powers to enforce bail for prisoners under indictment.
The later cases seem to have ruled in favor of the power to make this
use of the -writ,78 but there is no evidence that the power was frequently
employed.
Williamson v. Lewis, 39 Pa. 9, 27-28 (1861).
E.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885).
75 E.g., CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS § 363 (1884).
76 People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483, 568-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); In re Greenough,
31 Vt. 279, 288-89 (1858); CHURCH, HAEAS CORPUS § 244 (1884). It was also suggested
that the indictment cut off whatever right the defendant might have had to have
habeas corpus review of the sufficiency of the depositions or proofs upon which he
was originally arrested or committed.
77 31 Car. 2, c2, § 3 (1679).
78 Ex parte Campbell, 20 Ala. 89 (1852); Lumm v. State, 3 Ind. 293 (1852). Contra:
People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483, 568-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (dictum). The McLeod
dictum on this question provoked a celebrated reply by another New York judge, 26
Wend. 663, 692-99 (N.Y. 1841), a rejoinder by the author of the McLeod opinion, 3 Hill
635, 643-47, 668-71 (N.Y. 1842), and a surrejoinder by the original critic, 1 AM. LAw
73

74

MAG.

348, 355-59 (1843).
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The 1679 provisions respecting persons committed for "felony or
treason not only affected bail applicants, but also had indirect impact on
habeas corpus petitioners seeking absolute discharge. Successor legislation, which expressly forbade discharge by habeas corpus of persons
imprisoned on an indictment or by virtue of any process or commitment issued to enforce an indictment, significantly reduced the range
of habeas corpus relief.79 Even where there was no express statutory
prohibition, the fact that a court had unquestionably assumed jurisdiction over a prisoner by an indictment or formal judicial commitment
after hearing persuaded other courts of coordinate jurisdiction to refuse
to entertain applications for habeas corpus, at least so long as the committing court was in session.8 0 Similarly, appellate courts refused to
make inquiry by habeas corpus where the alleged defects could later be
brought before them by writ of error.8
The existence of an indictment did give the defendant an opportunity
for discharge by habeas corpus if he was not brought to trial within the
prescribed statutory period.8 2 The indicted defendant could also seek
release on the ground that the indictment did not charge an offense
punishable by law, but courts divided on whether such a defect was
a proper basis for release by habeas corpus.8 3
Habeas corpus petitions brought after conviction 8 4 fell under the
shadow of state legislation patterned after the original provision that
withheld the benefits of the Habeas Corpus Act from "persons convict or
in execution by legal process."8 5 Thus, several early state-court cases
denied habeas corpus relief to convicts on the ground that the statute
specifically excluded them from the benefit of the writ.8 6 These opinions
79 E.g., Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 290 (1854); Ex parte Ruthven, 17 Mo. 541 (1853).

80 Ex parte Bushnell, 8 Ohio 599 (1858); Ex parte Booth, 3 Wis. 145 (1854); Jack v.
The Sheriff, 7 Watts & Serg. 108, 109 (Pa. 1844) ("during the sitting of the court there
is no occasion whatever for the habeas corpus, for the court itself to whom the prisoner
is answerable may bring the party before it by a simple order, and bail, discharge or
remand him as they may see fit").
81 Norton v. Deacon, 8 Serg. & Rawl. 72 (Pa. 1822).
82 State v. Fasket, 5 Rich. 255 (S.C. 1851).
83 Matter of Corryell, 22 Cal. 178, 181 (1863) ("The Court derives its jurisdiction
from the law, and its jurisdiction extends to such matters as the law declares to be
criminal, and none other, and when it undertakes to imprison for an offense to which
no criminality is attached, it acts beyond its jurisdiction.'). Contra: Emanuel & Giles v.
State, 36 Miss. 627 (1859).
84 Judging from reported decisions, there were few habeas corpus applications prior
to 1850 by persons who had been convicted of a criminal offense, but a comparatively
large number thereafter. There seems to be no explanation for the marked increase
at this time.
85 31 Car. 2, c.2 § 8 (1679).
86 Riley's case, 19 Mass. 171 (1824); Matter of Goodhue, New York City-H. Rec. 158
(1816); Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81 (1857).
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of course presuppose (expressly or by implication) that the judgment
by which the petitioner became a "convict" was rendered by a court
possessing general jurisdiction in criminal cases.
It has been urged that the statutory provision about "persons convict"
had no bearing on convicts who were applying for the common law writ
of habeas corpus,87 but the force of this argument suffers from the
absence of evidence that the scope of review of final criminal judgments
was any more comprehensive by means of the common law writ than it
was under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, or other similar legislation.
There is little or no evidence in this country, perhaps because the common law habeas corpus powers were abrogated in some states, were ill
defined in others, and in any event could not be exercised during vacation or by individual judicial officers.
The familiar principle that barred convicts from habeas corpus relief
-a principle rarely if ever expressly limited to the statutory writ-was
enunciated by one court as follows:
[I]t will be obvious that this court nor no other court nor officer
can investigate the legality of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction by a writ of habeas corpus. If the court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, although its
proceedings may be irregular or erroneous, yet, they cannot be
set aside in this proceeding. The party must resort to his writ of
error or other direct remedy to reverse or set aside the judgment,
88
for in all collateral proceedings it will be held to be conclusive.
Included among those irregular or erroneous proceedings whose judgment could not be avoided by habeas corpus were those based upon
insufficient evidence or mistaken facts,8 9 a misdemeanor trial held without the defendant being present,90 or a proceeding terminating with a
judgment or sentence defective in some formality such as omission to
state the precise type of misdemeanor of which the defendant was
92
convicted 9' or the correct party to whom a fine should be paid.
87 Brief of Paul A. Freund for Respondent, pp. 30-32, United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205 (1952).
88 Ex parte Toney, 11 Mo. 661-62 (1848). The leading case in this country is
probably Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1829). The point is discussed at length
in The Writ of Habeas Corpus-Its Uses and Abuses, 5 PAcific C.L.J. 549 (1880);
Note, 26 Am. Dec. 40 (1886).
89 Ex parte Toney, 11 Mo. 661, 662 (1848); Stoner v. State, 4 Mo. 614 (1837); Adams
v. Vose, 67 Mass. 51, 54-55 (1854).
90 Ex parte Tracy, 25 Vt. 93 (1853).
91 In re O'Connor, 6 Wis. 288 (1857); State v. Shattuck, 45 N.H. 205 (1864). Contra:
Matter of Cavanagh, 10 How. Pr. 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
92 Phinney, Petitioner, 32 Me. 440 (1851).
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In order to use habeas corpus to attack an imprisonment under a
final criminal judgment the irregularity in the proceedings had to be of
such quality as to render the judgment void. A judgment was void under
this rule if the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.93
Similarly, it was held that a prisoner would be discharged by habeas
corpus if the law he was convicted of violating was unconstitutional, 94 or
if the punishment was greater than the court was authorized to impose.9 5
A prisoner was also entitled to discharge on habeas corpus if subsequent
events such as a pardon or expiration of the term of imprisonment had
deprived the judgment of conviction of validity as a basis for the
confinement 9 6
A large proportion of the "convicts" who presented habeas corpus
applications in state courts had been committed for contempt. Since
contempt adjudications were not reviewable by writ of error, certiorari or
appeal (in the absence of special statutory authorizations) 97 there were
special pressures for habeas corpus review in such cases. This may explain
why some decisions permitted habeas corpus review of mere errors or
irregularities in contempt commitments. 98 However, most courts seem
to have held fast to the usual common law rule that habeas corpus could
only upset commitments "pronounced by a court having no jurisdiction
or authority in the subject-matter." 99 Despite vigorous attempts to have
the habeas corpus tribunal find jurisdictional significance in the circumstances leading to the contempt, courts normally held that jurisdiction in
Miller v. Snyder, 6 Ind. 1 (1854).
Herrick v. Smith, 67 Mass. 1, 49 (1854); Ex parte Booth, 3 Wis. 157 (1854), rev'd
on other grounds, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). But cf. Platt v. Harrison, 6 Iowa 79,
(1858) (involving city ordinance).
95 Feenley's case, 66 Mass. 598 (1853); In the Matter of Sweatman, 1 Cow. 147 (N.Y.
1823); see Note, 56 U. PA. L. Rv. 255 (1908). But cf. Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St.
81 (1854) (habeas corpus will not lie when sentence less than minimum authorized).
96 In the Matter of Goodhue, New York City-H. Rec., 153 (1816); In re Edymoin,
8 How. Pr. 478 (N.Y. 1853) (county judge in chambers).
97 RA ALJE, Co=mNtrP
§ 141 (1884).
98 Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 181 (1857); Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. 751 (1844). A broader
scope of habeas corpus review of contempt commitments was advocated by the Court
of Common Pleas in Bushell's Case, Vaughn 135, 142, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009 (1670).
99 Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 18 (1855); CHURCH, HABEAs Coapus § 317 (1884).
The leading American decision is Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822),
where the Supreme Court, in denying habeas corpus relief to a petitioner committed
for contempt by a federal court, held that it should apply the same standard for
habeas corpus review of contempt commitments as for review of any judgment after
indictment: whether the committing court acted beyond its jurisdiction.
One respected court held that it had no power to inquire into the legality of a
contempt commitment made by a court of coordinate authority, but this judgment
was reversed. People v. Yates, 4 Johns. R. 317, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809), rev'd, 6 Johns.
R. 337 (N.Y. 1810).
93
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respect to a contempt commitment simply meant the power to punish
for contempt, without regard to how it was exercised in this particular
situation. 100 In one leading case the court declared:
Does anybody doubt the jurisdiction of the District Court to
punish contempt? Certainly not. All courts have this power, and
must necessarily have it; otherwise they could not protect themselves from insult, or enforce obedience to their process. Without it, they would be utterly powerless. The authority to deal
with an offender of this class belongs exclusively to the court in
which the offence is committed; and no other court, not even
,the highest, can interfere with its exercise, either by writ of
error, mandamus, or habeas corpus.1o'
Habeas corpus was an effective remedy when a contempt commitment
had been entered by a committing magistrate having no jurisdiction or
authority to commit for contempt, 102 when the prisoner was held without a formal adjudication of contempt, 103 and when the committing
authority had lost jurisdiction because the case out of which the civil
commitment had arisen was no longer before the court. 04 These same
principles were also applied to commitments for contempt of legislative
05
bodies.
B. Civil Arrest or Commitment
The availability of the statutory writ of habeas corpus for relief from
civil arrests or commitments was severely restricted by section 8 of the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which provided that "nothing in this act
shall extend to discharge out of prison any person charged in debt, or
other action, or with process in any civil cause . . . ."06 Identical or
substantially identical provisions were included in almost all of the
early American habeas corpus acts, which were patterned after the
100 Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9 (1855); Ex parte Cohen and Jones, 5 Cal. 494 (1855);
Ex parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883 (1853); State v. Towle, 42-N.H. 540 (1861); People v.
Cassels, 5 Hill. 164 (N.Y. 1843) (permitting the petitioner to introduce extrinsic evidence
to contradict the recitals of jurisdiction); Jordan v. State, 14 Tex. 436 (1855).
101 Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 18 (1855).
102 In re Remington, 7 Wis. 643 (1859); Clarke's Case, 66 Mass. 320 (1851).
103 Ex parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883 (1853).
104 Ex parte Maulsby, 13 Md. 625 (1859) (single judge); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 175
(1857).
105 Falvey & Kolrourn v. Massing, 7 Wis. 630 (1859); Burnham v. Morrissey, 80
Mass. 226 (1859).
106 31 Car. 2, c.2 § 8 (1679). In addition, the sec. 3 authority to grant the writ of
habeas corpus during vacation specifically refers to persons "other than persons
convict or in execution by legal process."
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English legislation.
These provisions were generally construed to
render the habeas corpus legislation inapplicable to parties held by
civil process. 108 Of course the common law habeas corpus powers usually
were theoretically available, but there were few, if any, reported instances
where they were used in this area. Consequently, unless the traditional
form of legislation was altered, 109 the writ of habeas corpus was not a
workable remedy for relief from civil commitment in most states. 110
The principal civil arrests or commitments affected by the habeas
corpus law were the capias ad respondendum, a mesne process by which
the sheriff was commanded to take the named party into custody in
order to have him before the court to answer the plaintiff in an action at
law, and the capias ad satisfaciendum, a writ of execution by which the
sheriff was commanded to take a defendant into custody in order to have
him before the court to satisfy the damages or debt named in the court's
judgment."'
Each of these means of confinement was the subject of special legislation relating to the availability of habeas corpus. A few states gave their
courts or judicial officers the power to use the writ of habeas corpus to
discharge persons held upon mesne process who had given reasonable
bail. 112 Far more significant statutory changes related to the capias ad
satisfaciendum, the process by which persons were imprisoned for debt.
Commencing about 1830 most states enacted legislation that permitted
insolvent debtors to obtain relief from imprisonment for obligations
founded on contract. 113 The writ of habeas corpus was made available
to enforce the release of debtors who had won their right to release by
complying with the provisions of this legislation, and there are numerous
reported cases where it was so used.114 In other cases, where civil com107 E.g., Ass. GN. LAWS 1784, ch. 72, § 1; N.Y. LAws 1787, ch. 39, § 8; PA. GEN.
LAws 1700-1849, ch. 81, § V.
108 Peltier v. Pennington, 14 N.J. 812 (1834) (Chief Justice in chambers); Ex parte
Wilson, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 52 (1810); Cable v. Cooper, 15 Johns. R. 152, 155 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1818); Contra: Hecker v. Jarret, 8 Binn. 404, 410-11 (Pa. 1811). Cf. State v. Ward,
8 N.J. 120 (1825) (Justice in chambers).
109 Some habeas corpus acts of states entering the union after 1800 either omitted
the exception for persons held under civil commitment or were expressly applicable
to confinement under civil process. ILL. REv. CODE 1827 p. 237-38, §§ 1, 2; 2 OHIO
STATS. 1788-1833 p. 754-55, § 1; see Hathaway v. Holmes, 1 Vt. 405, 415-16 (1828).
110 Bank of United States v. Jenkins, 18 Johns. R. 237, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820)
(dictum); Geyer v. Stoy, 1 Dall. 135 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1785) (semble).
111 BLAcK, LAW DICrONARY 262 (4th ed. 1951).
112 MAss. GEN. LAws 1784 ch. 72, §§ 1, 5; 2 N.H. LAws 1815, ch. 45, §§ 1, 5. One
court used this authority to discharge a person held by a capiasad respondendum.
113 E.g., Act of April 26, 1831, § 46, N.Y. STAT., p. 415 (Blatchford 1851). See generally
HuRD, HA.nAs CoRus ch. 3 (1858).
114 Ex parte Beatty, 12 Wend. 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Burroughs v. Willett, 15
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mitments continued to be used but where special legislation made the
writ available to those confined, the usual rules governing the issuance
of habeas corpus prevailed. The writ could not be employed where the
judgment upon which the execution was issued was only erroneous or
contained merely formal defects, 115 but it would effect the release of
those held by court orders issued without jurisdiction"1 6 or, in the case
of mesne process, without the necessary supporting affidavits in proper
7

form."1

C. Restraints other than Civil or Criminal Arrest or Commitment
A prisoner could also use the writ of habeas corpus to obtain freedom
from restraints other than civil or criminal arrest or commitment. The
reported cases in this category fall into three areas: confinement by
military authorities, commitment of the insane and slavery.
There are at least two recorded instances in which state courts issued
the writ of habeas corpus to release a private citizen from confinement
by federal military authorities." 8 This circumstance, which was repeated
several decades later in the celebrated federal habeas corpus cases of
Ex parte Milligan"1 9 and Ex parte Merryman,2 0 reveals the writ of
liberty performing what is perhaps its most essential task: freeing persons
from illegal official restraints of liberty not founded in judicial action. A
less essential use of the writ is revealed in the numerous cases where
members of the armed forces successfully employed it to obtain a ruling
on the validity of the restraints imposed upon them by contracts of
12 1
enlistment.
How. Pr. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); State v. Sheriff, 15 N.J. 68 (1835); Ex parte Davis,
18 Vt. 401 (1846).
115 Bell v. Miller, 4 Gill 301 (Md. 1846); Wiles v. Brown, 3 Barb. 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1848); Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509 (1834); CHURCH, HABEAs CoRPus § 383 (1884).
Another barrier to relief in these cases was the insistence of some courts that the
petitioner's correct remedy was not habeas corpus but a motion to the court that had
issued the capias ad satisfaciendum. Davis v. Lecky, 1 Watts 66 (Pa. 1832); Bank of
United States v. Jenkins, 18 Johns. R. 305 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
116 Commonwealth v. Hambright, 4 S. & R. 147 (Pa. 1818); In re Blair, 4 Wis. 522,
534 (1854).
117 Soule v. Hayward, 1 Cal. 345 (1850); Dwire v. Saunders, 15 Ind. 306 (1860)
(dictum).
118 Matter of Stacy, 10 Johns. R. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); State v. Wederstrandt,
Charlton's Rep. 213 (Ga. 1808). The jurisdictional question raised when a state court
is petitioned to issue its writ to a federal officer is discussed in text following note
164 infra.
119 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
120 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (Taney, C.J.).
121 Ex parte Cain, 39 Ala. 440 (1846); Ex parte Mitchell, 39 Ala. 442 (1864); Mines v.
Burdett, 33 Ga. 587 (1863); Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 67 (1814); Walker
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Another restraint that was challenged by the writ of habeas corpus
was that imposed upon inmates of hospitals for the insane. Judging
from the scarcity of reported cases, such challenges were rare. The only
noteworthy opinion in this period was that of Chief Justice Shaw of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which denied habeas corpus
relief to a lunatic by the name of Oakes.122 The following portions of
the court's opinion are instructive of the law applied in such cases.
It has been argued, that the constitution makes it imperative
upon the court to discharge any person detained against his
will; and that by the common law, no person can be restrained
of his liberty, except by the judgment of his peers, or the law of
the land. But we think there is no provision, either of the common law or of the constitution, which makes it the duty of the
court to discharge every person, whether sane or insane, who is
kept in confinement against his will.
The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty, is found
in that great law of humanity, which makes it necessary to confine those whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves
or others. In the delirium of a fever, or in the case of a person
seized with a fit, unless this were the law, no one could be
restrained against his will. And the necessity which creates the
law, creates the limitation of the law.
The question must then arise, in each particular case, whether
a person's own safety or that of others requires that he should be
restrained for a certain time, and whether restraint is necessary
for his restoration, or will be conducive thereto. The restraint
can continue as long as the necessity continues. This is the
123
limitation, and the proper limitation.
The court concluded from the evidence presented in a two-day hearing
that the petitioner should continue to be restrained, and remanded him
to the asylum.
The availability of the writ of habeas corpus in cases involving the
institution of slavery seems to have been dictated more by geography
than by doctrine. In northern states there were cases in which the writ
v. Morris, 3 AM. JusIsr 281 (Mass. 1830); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841); Matter
of Carleton, 7 Cow. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); United States v. Wyangall, 5 Hill. 16
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R. 93 (Pa. 1824); Ex parte
Coupland, 26 Tex. 386 (1862); Mann v. Parke, 57 Va. 443 (1864).
122 Matter of Oakes, 8 Monthly Law Reporter 122 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1845) (not
officially reported).
123 Id. at 124-25.
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of habeas corpus was issued in behalf of a person who was claimed as a
slave, and on the return of the writ the court held a hearing on the issue
of his freedom and either discharged him as a free man or remanded
124
him to his custodian on the ground that he was not.

In the South the "writ of liberty" generally would not lie when the
petitioner was a colored person and when the individual making the
return claimed that he held the petitioner in servitude. The principal
rationale for this rule was the master's right to a jury trial on the issue
of his property in the slave. 125 The following opinion is representative of
the courts' reasoning on this question:
In our opinion the constitution of this state, which declares that
the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, guaranties to
the master in such case the right to have a jury pass upon his
claim, and we apprehend the legislature could no more divest
him of his right to his slave by the fiat of a single individual,
than of his freehold. If he can be deprived of the right of trial
by jury in respect of the legal claim to his slave, the same principle might deprive the citizen of jury trial in respect to all
26
property.1
Another court asserted that the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy anyway, since a decision to discharge the petitioner
would not be res judicata on his right to freedom and would not prevent
the respondent from immediately taking him into custody again. 127 The
124 Arabas v. Ivers, 1 Conn. 92 (1784); State v. Raborg, 5 N.J.L. 642 (1819) (semble);
Commonwealth v. Holloway, 6 Binn. 213 (Pa. 1814). See also MD. CONsr. art. I, § 12
(1864). Cf. Wright v. Deacon, 5 S. & R. 61 (Pa. 1819); Sim's Case, 61 Mass. 285 (1851)

(fugitive slave act confinements).
An early New Jersey statute assumes the availability of this writ to remove "any
negro, mulatto, mestee, or Indian" out of the possession of anyone claiming his
service, but it provided a means by which the custodian could have a jury trial of the
issues joined therein. N.J. REv. LAws 1820 p. 376, § 29.
125 Renney v. Mayfield, 4 Hay. 165 (Tenn. 1817); Thornton v. Demoss, 13 Miss. 609
(1846); case cited in note 126 infra. Whatever the merit of this reasoning in a system
of law that recognized slavery, it would have no force in one that did not. Thus, in a
famous case where a writ of habeas corpus was used to free a negro slave about to be
sent to Jamaica by his American owner, Lord Mansfield refused to be influenced by
the argument that a judgment holding that the slave became entitled to his freedom
by being brought into England would also have the effect of setting at liberty at
least 14,000 others held in that country. Slavery, he said, "is so odious, that nothing
can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore,
may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the
law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged." The Negro Case, 20 How.
St. Tr. 1, 72, 82 (1773).
126 Field v. Walker, 17 Ala. 80, 82 (1849). The issues posed by the return to a writ
of habeas corpus were of course normally tried by the court. See note 209 infra.
127 Weddington v. Sloan, 54 Ky. 147, 154 (1854). Accord, State v. Brearly, 5 N.J.L.
653, 660 (1819) (prior order discharging petitioner because enlistment void not res
judicata in subsequent petition).
Although an order entered in a habeas corpus proceeding generally had no res
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prevalence of statutes patterned after the English provision penalizing
the respondent for recapturing a petitioner discharged by habeas corpus s
makes the later proposition questionable, at least in states whose penalty
provision was not limited to recaption of persons released from criminal
commitment.
States that had created a statutory remedy at law by which alleged
slaves could litigate the issue of their freedom denied such persons access
to habeas corpus on the ground that the statutory remedy was exclusive. 129 States that lacked such a statutory remedy sometimes withheld
the benefits of the writ because (it was said) the slave could litigate his
right to freedom by an action at law against his master for trespass or
false return (to the writ of habeas corpus).130 In applying these rules
southern courts also relied upon or at least referred to a new rule that
color was prima facie evidence of liability to servitude, 3 1 and to an
old principle that the petitioner could not introduce evidence contra32
dicting the facts set out in the retur.
Although southern courts were apparently unanimous in denying the
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to slaves, 1 33 these same courts
usually declared that the writ was available to persons of color who had
been granted their freedom.' 3 4 The crucial distinction was between
judicata effect, the ruling was binding on the parties in subsequent litigation where
the real object of the first proceeding was "to obtain a decision upon some claim of
right" by either party. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENrs § 324 (4th ed. 1892). Thus, an order on a
petition for habeas corpus in a child custody dispute was conclusive on the parties so
long as the facts remained the same. E.g., Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64 (N.Y. Ct.
Err. 1840); cases cited in Note, 35 Am. DEc. 668, 669 (1886). That same principal was
later applied to habeas corpus cases involving the validity of a contract of enlistment,
FPEMAN op. cit. supra, and undoubtedly should also have been applied to cases
involving a slave's right to freedom. Cf. Alexander v. Stokeley, 7 S. & R. 299 (Pa. 1821)
(homine replegiando in slavery case). See also authorities cited note 66 supra.
128 31 Car. 2, c.2, § 6 (1670) (only applied to persons afterward "imprisoned or
committed for the same offense'); Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 6, 1 Ky. DIGFsr oF STAT. LAW
775 (1834) (same); I MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 72, § 12 (1823) (applies to recaption of any
person "discharged by habeas corpus'); 2 N.Y. RiEv. STATS. 1828, p. 571, § 59 (same).
129 Field v. Walker, 17 Ala. 80 (1849); Thornton v. Demoss, 13 Miss. 609 (1846);
ILL. Rxv. CODE 1827, p. 241, § 8; see DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 443 (1836).
130 Renley v. Mayfield, 4 Hay. 165 (Tenn. 1817); see Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360,
363 (1859).
131 Field v. Walker, 17 Ala. 80 (1849); Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360 (1859); Thornton
v. Demoss, 13 Miss. 609 (1846). But cf. State v. Philpot, Dudley's Rep. 46, 52 (Ga. 1831).
132 Renney v. Mayfield, 4 Hay. 165 (Tenn. 1817); authorities cited note 5 supra.
But cf. DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 443, 448 (1836).
133 Other varieties of habeas corpus were of course available to bring a slave before
the court for purposes ancilliary to other litigation. E.g., see Sam v. Fore, 20 Miss.
413 (1849).
:134 Field v. Walker, 17 Ala. 80, 82 (1849); Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 363-67 (1859);
cases cited notes 136 and 137 infra. Contra, Thornton v. Demoss, 13 Miss. 609 (1846).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32.243

those cases in which an issue as to the petitioner's status was "really
involved" or where there was a "real contest and fair subject of controversy"-where the writ was denied' 3 5-and those cases where there
was "no real litigation as to the right to freedom"-where the writ
might be granted.'3 6 Thus, in Virginia and Georgia cases where the
petitioners attached documentary evidence of their freedom and where
the respondent claimed they were slaves but did not aver in the return
that they were his slaves, the petitioners were discharged by means of
37
the writ of habeas corpus.'
D. Third-Party Uses of the Writ to Obtain Custody of the Prisoner
In the habeas corpus cases considered thus far the petitioner was the
prisoner himself, or (if he was unable to initiate the petition) another
person asserting the prisoner's right to freedom by a petition brought in
his behalf.'3 8 In contrast, there is a fourth group of habeas corpus cases

in which the third party sought the petition at least partially in his own
behalf, not striving to win the prisoner's freedom but seeking rather to
win the right to the prisoner's custody for himself. These cases ranged all
the way from instances of masters seeking possession of slaves to cases
of parents using the writ to adjudicate the right to custody of a child.
In these cases the writ was used almost as if the prisoner were property
whose rightful ownership or possession was at issue. The analogy to the
writ of replevin is obvious, and, indeed, in some states an ancient variation of that writ, the writ de homine replegiando, was resurrected and
used as an alternate to the writ of habeas corpus.
1. Child Custody. Early state habeas corpus controversies over the
custody of minors involved exclusively the common-law writ of habeas
corpus, since the English Habeas Corpus Act and similar American
legislation only applied to persons committed for criminal matters. Even
the remedial legislation authorizing the writ of habeas corpus to inquire
into any case of illegal restraint of liberty probably did not apply
in the usual child custody case where the respondent was a parent or
guardian, since the restraint imposed by such persons could rarely
be termed "illegal."'- 39 On the other hand, the common law could not
'35 Field v. Walker, 17 Ala. 80, 82 (1849); Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 367 (1859).

136 DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 444 (1836).
137 Ibid.; State v. Philpot, Dudley's Rep. 46 (Ga. 1831). Cf. Ruddle v. Ben, 37 Va.
437 (1839).
138 CHURcH, HABEAS CoRPus § 91 (1884); Note, Right of Stranger to Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1173 (1907).
139 E.g., State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462, 466-67 (1830); Foster v. Alston, 7 Miss. 406, 456-57
(1842); People v. Wilcox, 22 Barb. 178, 187-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); Gishwiler v. Dodez,
4 Ohio St. 615, 621 (1855).
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be too technical about the nature of the restraint in such cases or the
habeas corpus remedy would fail altogether. 140
The first problem posed for one seeking to invoke the common law
writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody of a minor and an adjudication
of guardianship was the fact that this writ was traditionally used simply
to relieve a person from a restraint on his liberty. Could one realistically
speak of a restraint on the liberty of a child too young to exercise any
choice as to his surroundings? Moreover, could the court give any more
relief by means of the writ of habeas corpus than merely to free the
child so that he might go where he chose?
Where a child had attained the age of discretion (which seems to
have been about fourteen years, 141 although the courts were never very
precise about it), the common law courts adhered to the traditional
habeas corpus approach and simply ordered that the restraints on
the child's liberty be removed so that he could go where he chose.142
Sometimes the court ordered its officers to protect such a minor for
a time to prevent his recaption by the original custodian, but the court
would not deliver him into the custody of the relator. 43
Where a child was under the age of discretion, however, nothing was
to be accomplished simply by ordering the restraints removed. In this
circumstance a habeas corpus court had to choose between either dedining to entertain the writ or departing from the traditional scope of
habeas corpus by granting the writ, determining who should have
custody, and ordering the child delivered to the proper custodian. For
a time the common law courts seemed to be embracing both alternatives.
In 1724 Lord Raymond, after first doubting whether he could go
farther than seeing that the child was under no illegal restraint, ordered
a nine-year-old delivered to her guardian, the petitioner. 44 Ten years
later that case was overruled in a petition brought by a father for his
140 In the Matter of Mitchell, Charlton's Rep. 489, 492 (Ga. 1836): "To confine the
writ of habeas corpus at common law exclusively to cases of illegal confinement.
would be destructive of the ends of justice. It would enable a kidnapper to maintain
possession of a child of tender years (taken by him by fraud or force from the bosom
of its family), merely because its want of legal discretion would preclude the idea of
its being confined against its will. I apprehend that it is not going too far to say,
that the interests and welfare of society require, that under peculiar circumstances, the
fact that the child of tender years is detained improperly from the custody of the
person entitled to its possession is sufficient to ground and maintain the writ of
habeas corpus." Accord, Trainer v. Cooper, 8 How. Pr. 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
141 Queen v. Clarke, 7 El. & B1. 186, 196-97, 119 Eng. Rep. 1217, 1221 (Ex. 1856).
Habeas Corpus, Custody of Infant, 15 CENT. L.J. 281, 283 (1882).
142 Authorities cited notes 143, 145, and 157 infra.
143 E.g., Rex v. Clarkson, 1 Str. 444, 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (K.B. 1721).
144 Rex v. Johnson, 1 Str. 579, 93 Eng. Rep. 711 (K.B. 1724).
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thirteen-year-old. 145 The judges resolved "that upon this writ they
could only deliver him out of the custody of the aunt, and inform him
he was at liberty to go where he pleased."' 146 When the boy chose to
to remain with his aunt the judges took no further action because "the
right of guardianship could not be determined by them in this summary
way . . . ,u47 Three decades later the pronouncement in the case was
itself rejected by Lord Mansfield in his important dictum in Rex V.
Delaval,148 probably the best known and most influential habeas corpus
authority imported into this country with the common law. In that case,
which involved an order discharging from all restraint an eighteenyear-old girl who was alleged to have been detained by a third party for
immoral purposes, Lord Mansfield asserted a power (which he did not
exercise) to resolve custody matters on habeas corpus, coupled with broad
discretion on whether it should be exercised in any given case:
In cases of writs of habeas corpus directed to private persons "to
bring up infants," the court is bound, ex debite justiciae, to set
the infant free from an improper restraint: but they are not
bou nd to deliver them over to any body nor to give them any
privilege. This must be left to their discretion, according to the
149
circumstances that shall appear before them.
The true rule is, "that the court are to judge upon the circumstances of the particular case; and to give their directions
accordingly."15
The proposition relating to discretion was imperative to the proper
administration of Mansfield's rule on the power to resolve custody
questions. If habeas corpus courts were to have power to determine the
right of guardianship, they had to have discretion in whether to exercise that power, especially in the usual case where a child was in the
custody of the mother. Otherwise, the common law rule giving the
father the legal right of custody' 51 would give him an absolute powerexercisable by habeas corpus-to have a court order the mother to
Rex v. Smith, 2 Str. 983, 93 Eng. Rep. 983 (K.B. 1734).
Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763).
at 1436, Eng. Rep. at 914.
349 Id.
15o Id. at 1437, Eng. Rep. at 914.
151 E.g., King v. DeManneville, 5 East 221, 223, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055 (K.B. 1804).
In his argument in Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. 523, 526 (1843), counsel said of this rule:
"It is a universal principle in civilized nations. It is the natural law-the Christian
law. It is founded on the physical, moral and intellectual superiority of the male sex.
It results from the duty devolved by law on the father, to maintain, educate and
protect his children. To discharge the duty, requires the power and involves the right."
145

146
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surrender custody of the child to him, whatever the circumstances. 152
This is exactly what began to happen in England when habeas corpus
courts assumed Mansfield's power to resolve custody controversies,
but neglected to exercise the discretion he asserted. 153 The consequence
of their opinion that they "must" make an order for proper legal custody
in all cases tendered by habeas corpus' 54 were orders tearing children
away from their mothers and delivering them to fathers in circumstances
so offensive that the law eventually had to be changed by Parliament. 155
The American decisions seem to have been in agreement that where
the child had attained the age of discretion, the habeas corpus court
could only order him set at liberty, and could not adjudicate who should
be his custodian and order him delivered to that person.356 One opinion
on this question states the court's want of power in this circumstance
so broadly as to preclude custody and delivery orders even where the
children were under the age of discretion, 157 but when that circumstance
arose for litigation this same court found adequate common law power
158
to make the appropriate order.
In other states, especially where courts had asserted their inability
to resolve any custody questions by habeas corpus, 59 legislatures
enacted measures that authorized use of the writ of habeas corpus in
custody battles between husband and wife and specifically empowered
the court to award custody according to the welfare of the child.160
Such legislation was narrowly drawn and the reported cases show that
152 If the father already had custody, his paramount legal right would predude
habeas corpus relief for the mother. Ex parte Skinner, 9 Moore C.P. 278, 281 (Ch.
1824); State v. Stigall, 22 N.J. L. 286, 288-89 (1849).
153 Cases cited notes 151 and 152 supra and 154 infra.
154 King v. Greenhill, 4 Adol. & El. 624, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836).
155 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54 (1839). See discussion in Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64, 104-05

(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1840).
156 People v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, 642-43 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1836) (dictum); In the
Matter of Kottman, 2 Hill 363 (S.C. 1833), case cited note 157 infra.
157 State v. Cheeseman, 5 N.J. L. 522, 525 (1819): "It is for the relief of the prisoner,
and the prisoner only. It is to inquire why the liberty of the citizen is restrained. This,
then, is its legitimate and only object-to relieve from restraint and imprisonment....
If one of two parties unlawfully restrain and imprison the person about whom the
contest arises, the writ steps in and relieves from restraint, but leaves the contest, as
to possession, to be decided in another mode."
158 Mayne v. Baldwin, 5 N.J. Eq. 454 (Ch. 1846); State v. Stigall, 22 N.J. L. 286
(1849).
159 See, e.g., People v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, 643 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1836). Several
decades later the New York courts were able to find a common law power of delivery
by habeas corpus, although the common law continued to impose its strong advantages
in favor of the father. Trainor v. Cooper, 8 How. Pr. 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
160 E.g., 2 N.Y. Rav. STATS. 1828, pp. 148-49; IND. R V. STATS. 1843, ch. 35, §§ 73-77,
p. 606.
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the moving party was frequently left to his common law remedy where
the custodian was the grandparent or guardian instead of the parent.161
Thanks to the devotion paid to Lord Mansfield and his dictum in
Delaval, most American states were able, through the natural development of the common law, to reject the rigid English approach and to
use the writ of habeas corpus as a viable and relatively fair means of
resolving custody disputes in a manner best adapted to serve the welfare
of the child.162 There are numerous cases where courts asserted and
exercised their powers to resolve issues on the guardianship of young
children by habeas corpus. In some instances courts exercised their
discretion to refuse habeas corpus relief to one who was probably the
rightful legal custodian, when to do so would interfere with a custody
(normally the mother's) that they thought best for the child. 63 In
many other cases courts exercised the anomalous common law authority
asserted by Mansfield, and ordered that the subject children, brought
into court by means of the writ of habeas corpus, be delivered into the
custody of the petitioner. 64
2. Enlistees in Armed Forces;Master-Apprentice.When a claim to the
custody of a minor stemmed from the relation of master-apprentice or
from a contract of enlistment in the armed forces the principles evolved
in child-custody controversies were generally controlling, but each of
these cases involved additional problems.
Habeas corpus cases involving minor members of the armed forces
161 Trainor v. Cooper, 8 How. Pr. 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853); People v. Wilcox,
22 Barb. 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64, 83, 95 (N.Y. Ct.
Err. 1840); Young v. State, 15 Ind. 480 (1861). The identity of the respondent could
have a determining effect on the court's power to give relief if the court applied the
rigid commonlaw rules in favor of the father's legal right in commonlaw cases and
the liberal discretionary authorizations in cases covered by the statutes. Cf. Trainor v.
Cooper, supra. One wonders if this difference does not explain why counsel for
fathers so often brought commonlaw habeas corpus proceedings and named as
custodian-respondent not the wife, but rather the maternal grandfather with whom
she resided. E.g., Mercein v. People, supra; Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1842).
162 See generally, HuRD, HABEAs CORPUS 465-536 (1858); CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS
§§ 438-52 (1884); Habeas Corpus-Custody of Infant, 15 CFNT. L.J. (1882); Habeas
Corpus Proceedings for the Release of Infants, 36 CENT. L.J. 385 (1903).
163 Nickols v. Giles, 2 Conn. 461 (1796); In the Matter of Mitchell, Charlton's Rep.
489 (Ga. 1836); Whitney v. Whitney, I Chi. Leg. News 37 (Cook Co. Ct., flL. 1868);
State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462 (1830); Foster v. Alston, 7 Miss. 406 (1842); State v. Stigall,
22 N.J. L. 286 (1849); Mercein v. Barry, 25 Wend. 64 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1840); Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813); Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. 523 (1843).
164 Wright v. Johnson, 5 Ark. 687 (1844); Ex parte Ralston, Charlton's Rep. 119
(Ga. 1824); In the Matter of Mitchell, Charlton's Rep. 489 (Ga. 1836); Bounell v. Berryhill, 2 Ind. 613 (1851); cases cited note 158 supra; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass.
(16 Pick.) 203 (1834); People v. Nickerson, 19 Wend. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Ward v.
Roper, 26 Tenn. 111 (1846).
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posed the question whether a state court had jurisdiction to issue the
writ for a person held in the custody of a federal officer. With the
exception of doubts expressed by Chancellor Kent in one early New
York case, 165 state court opinions and judgments seem to have been
unanimous in favor of the jurisdiction.'6 6 When Kent joined a court
freeing a prisoner from the custody of United States Army officers 617
and then wrote approvingly of these cases in his influential Commentaries on American Laws 6 8 the issue was conclusively settled in
favor of the jurisdiction. 169 In 1859 the United States Supreme Court
upset these state decisions in A bleman v. Booth. 70 As would be expected,
however, southern courts persistently sustained state court jurisdiction, 171 and state writs of habeas corpus for members of the armed
forces vexed the Confederacy during the War Between the States. 172
Some courts were unwilling to make the writ of habeas corpus
available to a master seeking to obtain the release of his minor apprentice
because the master had a right to an action at law against the person
alleged to have seduced the apprentice from his service.'1 3 However,
165 In the Matter of Ferguson, 9 Johns. R. 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812).
166 Sims Case, 61 Mass. 285, 309 (1851) (dictum that issuance of habeas corpus "is
constantly done, in cases of soldiers and sailors, held by military and naval officers,
under enlistments complained of as illegal and void.'); cases cited in notes 118 and
121 supra; Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63 (1814); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H.
194 (1841); State v. Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 555 (1819); In the Matter of Carlton, 7 Cow. 471
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); numerous cases involving members of the armed forces are
discussed and quoted in HURD, HABEAS Coas'us 164-202 (1858).
167 In the Matter of Stacy, 10 Johns. R. 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
168 1 KENT, COMMENTAIES ON AMERICAN LAW 400 (4th ed. 1840).
169 At least one state made its habeas corpus act unavailable to persons held by
the authority of federal courts or -military officers. ILL. REv. CODE 1827, § 8, p. 240.
170 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
171 E.g., Mims v. Wimberly, 33 Ga. 587 (1863).
172 Ibid.; Ex parte Lockhart, 39 Ala. 450 (1864); Ex parte Barton, 39 Ala. 452
(1864); Ex parte Graham, 39 Ala. 454 (1864); Ex parte Lee, 39 Ala. 457 (1864); Ex parte
Graham, 39 Ala. 459 (1864); Ex parte Starke, 39 Ala. 475 (1864); State ex rel. Ellerbe
v. Daniel, 39 Ala. 546 (1865); cases cited note 121 supra from Alabama, Georgia,
Virginia and Texas; cases cited in RoBARas, DECISIONS OF THE SUPRME COURT OF TEXAS
RENDERED UPON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS DURING THE TERMs IN
1862, 1863, 1864 AND 1865 (1865).
173 Lea v. White, 36 Tenn. 73, 74 (1856) ("The object of the writ of habeas corpus
was not to enable persons to assert a right to property, or to the services of another,
but to protect the liberty of the subject. An action on the case for seducing the
apprentice from the master's service, instead of a habeas corpus, would have been a
proper remedy.').
The availability of the legal remedy was also given as a reason for denying the writ
on discretionary grounds. In the Matter of Ferguson, 9 Johns. R. 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1812); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1 S. & R. 352 (Pa. 1815) (as an alternative ground
the court held there was no restraint reachable by habeas corpus since the minor
wished to remain in the Army).
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most courts seem to have been willing to use the writ to adjudicate the
validity of the restraints under which the apprentice was held.
Since the minors involved in enlistment and apprenticeship relationships were normally old enough to exercise some choice as to their
custodian, the type of remedy given by the habeas corpus court typically
corresponded to that involved in those child-custody cases where the
minor had attained the age of discretion. Where it was shown that a
master had no legal right to the continued custody of a minor apprentice, 174 or where it was demonstrated that a contract of enlistment gave
no basis for restraining the liberty of the enlistee, 175 the court normally
adjudicated the invalidity of the restraint and ordered the minor discharged, giving him liberty to go where he pleased. In some cases the
court even assured the minor the temporary presence of officers of
the court to protect him in his choice.Y76 As in the comparable childcustody cases, some of these opinions implied that courts had no power
177
to order custody transferred from the respondent to the petitioner.
On the other hand, two respected courts suggested by implication or
by dictum that they enjoyed such power at common law, 178 and in one
notable case the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly
ordered that a minor "be discharged from the custody of the respondent
179
[U.S. Navy], and restored to that of the guardian."'
3. Slaves. The rules governing an alleged slave's access to the writ of
habeas corpus to litigate his right to freedom were discussed in an
earlier section. The geographical differences noted there are also
174 Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 6 Mass. 273 (1810); In the Matter of M'Dowle, 8
Johns. R. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). Cf. Newman's Case, Ohio Dec. Reprints 22 (Ct. Com.
Pleas 1843) (writ denied on the merits).
175 Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63 (1814); Commonwealth v. Fox, 7 Pa.
836 (1847); cf. State v. Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1819); Commonwealth v.
Murray, 4 Binn. 487 (Pa. 1812) (writ denied on the merits).
176 Cases cited note 174 supra.
'77 E.g., In the Matter of M'Dowle, 8 Johns. R. 328, 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); cf.
case cited note 173 supra. The commentators argued that an order for the delivery of
an apprentice effectively denied him a jury trial on issues respecting the validity of
his indenture of apprenticeship, and granted his master specific performance on a
contract for personal services. HuRD, HABEAs CoRPus 545-48 (1858); CHURCH, HABEAS

CoaPsus § 445 (1884).
178 Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63, 66 (1814); Commonwealth v. Robinson,

1 S. & R. 353, 356 (Pa. 1815) ("But a habeas corpus may be issued at common law,
under which courts have gone so far, as to deliver the body of an infant to his
parent, and sometimes an apprentice to his master. It is discretionary, however,
whether to proceed to that length or not.').
179 Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227, 232 (1836). An Indiana
statute impliedly enacts the same rule by providing: "Writs of habeas corpus shall
2 IND. REV.
be granted in favor of parents, guardians, masters and husbands .
STATS. 1852, p. 320, § 737.
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apparent in cases where the petitioner was a third person seeking to
obtain custody of the alleged slave.
In the South, where the master's right to a jury trial before being
deprived of his property prevented slaves from litigating their right to
freedom by habeas corpus, somewhat the same considerations seem
to have prevented slave owners from using the writ to recover possession
of slaves. An 1845 Virginia decision, where a slaveowner sought the
writ to effect the release from the penitentiary of a Negro felon who
was alleged to be his slave, expresses the traditional doctrine:
It may be that the owner of a slave, in ignorance that he is
prosecuted, might be the subject of wrong. But this Court
cannot therefore now undertake to unsettle the law, and legislate for his redress. This writ never seems to have been given in
contemplation of its executing the office it is now called upon
to perform. It is a high prerogative writ, the great object of
which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause. It was framed for the security of liberty. It is
now asked by persons claiming to be masters, for the restoration
of their slave to their possession. It is not prayed for by William
Mayo, but by his masters; and it seems to the Court that it
cannot be granted on their application, when on the same facts
it would be denied on his own. By the statute, the writ is
to be awarded on the application of the person in custody,
or by some other person on his behalf. Whenever applied for it
is the application of the prisoner. Whosoever may file the petition, it can only be issued at the instance of the party in
custody; or at least with his consent: as no man can be brought
up a prisoner without his consent. King v. Reynolds, 6 T.R.
497; King v. Edwards, 7 T.R. 745. Upon these principles, the
writ would be discharged if even it were prayed for by the convict, as he could not be now admitted to question the jurisdiction to which by his own act he had submitted; if even that
Court had not, as it certainly had, jurisdiction as to him,
whether a slave or a free man of colour.
But the Court goes farther, and is of opinion, that the purposes of the writ cannot be perverted to such uses as this. That
it cannot, under colour of an application on behalf of the
slave, be used by the master to enable him to take possession of
the subject of the writ, as property1s 0
In short, the court flatly refused to let the "freedom writ" be used by
a third party as a process of recaption. The appropriate process in such
180 Ex parte Ball, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 588, 592-93 (1845); cf. Williamson's Case 26 Pa.
9, 25 (1855) (concurring opinion).
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181

a case was the writ de homine replegiando, which will be discussed
later.
Mississippi is the only southern state where the writ of habeas corpus
seems to have been used to recover slaves, and there the remedy was
prescribed by statute wherever slaves were "taken or seduced out of the
possession of the master, owner or overseer . . . by force, strategem

or fraud, and unlawfully detained .... .182
The doctrinal inconsistency between this remedy, where a judge tried the issues and exercised the power to remove the slaves from their existing custodian and
restore them to their rightful owner, and the right-to-jury rationale
for refusing a similar habeas corpus remedy to slaves for testing their
right to freedom, 83 does not seem to have influenced the lawmakers.
In northern courts, where habeas corpus was available to petitioning
slaves, the writ was also available to slave owners seeking to recover
runaway slaves and to abolitionists seeking to prevent their removal
to the South.
Northern lawmakers drew an analogy to the child-custody cases in
providing that the writ of habeas corpus could be used by a slaveowner to regain custody of his slave. 184 The abolitionist feelings that
began to run high in the North about 1830185 brought serious qualifications to this remedy, however. By 1840 four northern states had provided
by statute that when a writ of habeas corpus was sought to bring up
the body of an alleged fugitive from labor or service the issues should
be determined by a jury. 8 6 Other statutes of this character, collectively
181 "The common law of England, as it was when Pennsylvania was settled, could
not have allowed a habeas corpus for the purpose of enforcing slavery; for it did not
recognize such an institution. The common law remedy, for trying the title to a
feudal villein, was the writ de homine replegiando, and that was the writ used by us in
slave cases." Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 25-26 (1855) (concurring opinion).
182 Miss. COMP. STATS. § 11, 1802-39. There are numerous cases under this
statute. In some the slaves were ordered restored to the petitioner. Scudder v. Seals,
1 Miss. (Walker) 154 (1824); Steele v. Shirley, 17 Miss, (9 S.& M.) 382 (1848). In others
relief was denied because the facts set forth in the petition did not bring the case
within the narrow limits of the habeas corpus provision and thus the enabling legislation did not apply. Hardy v. Smith, 3 S.& M. 316 (Miss. 1844); Nations v. Alvis, 13
Miss. (5 S.& M.) 338 (1845); Steele v. Shirley, 21 Miss. (13 S.& M.) 197 (1849);
Buckingham v. Levi, 23 Miss. 590 (1852).
183 See discussion in text at note 125 supra.
184 CONN. Comp. LAws 1838, p. 571, § 1; N.Y. REv. STATS. 1828, p. 560-61, §§ 6-12;
Ex parte Williamson, 3 Am. Law Reg. 741, 744 (1855) (dictum of Chief Justice in
chambers); Wheeler v. Williamson, 3 Am. Law Reg. 729 (U.S.D.C. E.D. Pa. 1855).
185 The intense public excitement over the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Laws,
in which the writ of habeas corpus played an important part, is described in McDouGALL, FUGrrIVE SLAvEs, ch. 3 (1891); 1 NEVINS, ORDEAL oF Tm

UNION

380-90 (1947);

2 id. 150-54.
186 Act of June 1, 1838,
§ 3, IND. REv. STATS. 1838,

§ 1, CONN. COMP. LAws 1838, p, 572; Act of Jan. 22, 1824,
p. 322; Act of May 6, 1840, § 1, N.Y. LAws 1840, p. 174;

Act of Oct. 29, 1840, § 1, VT. LAws 1840, p. 13.
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known as "personal liberty laws," required the state's prosecuting
attorney to render his advice and professional services to the fugitive at
the county's expense, 18 t and required a slaveowner who sought to
obtain custody of a fugitive by habeas corpus to post a bond of $1,000
from which would be deducted the costs and expenses of the proceeding
and a payment to the fugitive of $100 plus damages if the jury's verdict
8s
was against the slaveowner's claim.1
In 1842 a Pennsylvania statute, which made it a felony for anyone to
carry away a Negro from any part of the state with the intent of
causing him to be detained in slavery' 8 9-an obvious conflict with the
federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793190-was held unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.191 Northern
states reacted with additional legislation designed along lines suggested
in the Prigg opinion'9 2 to withdraw all state assistance from federal
enforcement without posing the direct federal-state conflict condemned
3
there.19
In the meantime, the writ of habeas corpus continued to be an important weapon in the hands of abolitionists. Several cases illustrate its
use to prevent the removal to the South of Negro slaves already in the
hands of their masters. 94 In addition, the statute books contain enactments apparently designed to ensure the availability of habeas corpus
95
for this purpose where the content of the common law was unsure.
4. Principal and Bail. Other cases where the writ of habeas corpus
was used to deliver the body of a prisoner from one custody to another
187 Act of May 6, 1840, § 9, N.Y. LAws 1840, p. 175; Act of Oct. 29, 1840, § 6, VT.
LAws 1840, p. 14.
188 Act of May 6, 1840, § 12, N.Y. LAws 1840, p. 176-77; Act of Oct. 29, 1840, § 8,
VT. LAWs 1840, p. 14.
189 9 PA. Aws 1825-27, p. 95,
190 1 Stat. 802 (1793).

§ 1.

191 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
192 Id. at 614-16.
193 The most common provision forbade state officers from exercising any jurisdiction
or issuing any certificates or warrants of removal under the 1793 federal act. Other
common provisions forbade the use of state jails to detain persons claimed as fugitives
from labor, and punished the use of force or violence to carry away persons claimed
as fugitives or to interfere with them after they had been released by hearings on state
habeas corpus. Act to Prevent Slavery, 1844, § 5, CONN. REV. STATS. p. 797, 798 (1854);
Act of Mar. 24, 1843, MfAss. AmrS 1843, p. 33; Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, PA. GEN.
LAws 1700-1849 p. 1092; VT. CoMp. STATS. 1850, ch. 101. For a summary of other
personal liberty laws, principally those passed in the 1850's, consult McDouGALL, FuGITiVE SLAvEs, ch. 5 (1891).

194 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 72 (1841); Commonwealth v. Ayes,
35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836); In re Francisco, 9 Am. Jurist 490 (Mass. 1832) (before
Shaw, C.J.); see McDOUGALL, FUGrIvE SLAvEs 39 (1891); cf. Ex parte Lawrence, 5 Binn.
304 (Pa. 1812).
195 E.g., VT. CoMP. STATS. ch. 101,

§9

(1843).
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involved the relation of principal and bail.
This relation was created
when a prisoner (the "principal") procured his release from imprisonment by presenting a bailbond or recognizance of a surety (the "bail").
The law gave the bail generous rights commensurate with his responsibilities. It considered the principal "as a prisoner, whose gaol liberties
are enlarged or circumscribed, at the will of his bail."' 9 7 In the form of
another popular metaphor, "the bail has the principal on a string, and
may pull it when he pleases ....
,19 The bail manifested his control
by a bail-piece, a document by virtue of which the bail could secure
the aid of courts or state officers or act himself to arrest the principal
"at all times and in all places .... ."199
Principals made conventional use of the writ of habeas corpus to
200
test the legality of the custody imposed upon them by their bails.
A more novel use of habeas corpus arose when the bail petitioned for
the writ to recover custody of his principal. 201 In one leading case, where
a sheriff had arrested the principal on civil process, the court ordered
that he be "relieved from the custody of the sheriff, that his bail may
proceed with him." 202 The opinion explained:
The writ of habeas corpus may issue at the instance of the party
restrained of his liberty, or at the instance of any other person
who has a right to the custody of such person; and the English
books abound with cases of habeas corpus at the instance of
special bail; and this, in civil cases, is a matter of course. When
confined on a criminal charge, it must be on motion; but in
20 3
either case it is not matter of favour, but ex debito justitiae.
In an earlier case, involving a principal confined on a criminal charge, a
196 See HuRD, HABEAS CoRPus 60-72 (1858). The best judicial discussion of this
relation is in Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. R. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (civil damage
action).
197 Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns R. 144, 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
198 Holsey v. Trevillo, 6 Watts 402, 404 (Pa. 1837).
199 Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. R. 144, 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
200 Commonwealth v. Brickett, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 137 (1839); Ex parte Lafonta, 2
Rob. 495 (La. 1842). But see Respublica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 263 (Pa. 1801). A question
frequently litigated in these cases was whether the bail could exert his confining
authority in a state other than that in which the bail-piece had been issued. It was
uniformly held that he could. Ibid.
201 Hyde v. Jenkins, 6 La. 427, 429 (1834); cases cited notes 202 and 204 infra. Cf.
Respublica v. Gaoler, 2 Yeates 263 (Pa. 1798) (writ denied on merits; no suggestion that
court lacked power to transfer custody of prisoner by means of writ). Compare the
courts' use of the writ of habeas corpus cum causa, where the order transfers the
custody of the prisoner from a lower court to the officers of the higher court to
facilitate review of the case there.
202 Holsey v. Trevillo, 6 Watts 402, 404 (Pa. 1837).
203 Id. at 403. (Emphasis added.)
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court remanded the principal to prison, but ordered that after his sen204
tence had been served "he should be delivered over to the bail."
In conclusion, there are frequent instances where a third party has
sought habeas corpus for purposes other than to assure the freedom of
the nominal petitioner. In some of these cases the court emphatically
denied that this was a proper function for the "freedom writ." In other
cases-some in each of the subject areas discussed-courts either expressed
approval of such a practice or actually issued their writ of habeas corpus
to assist one person in obtaining custody of another.
IV.

Ti

WRiT

De Homine Replegiando

No discussion of the role of the writ of habeas corpus in state courts
would be complete without reference to the companion remedy available
through the writ de homine replegiando, later called the writ of personal
replevin. Blackstone described this writ as follows:
The writ de homine replegiando lies to replevy a man out of
prison, or out of the custody of any private person, (in the same
manner that chattels taken in distress may be replevied, of
which in the next chapter) upon giving security to the sheriff
that the man shall be forthcoming to answer any charge against
him.

205

2 06
Available accounts of the common law practice are somewhat obscure.
Upon service of the writ the sheriff apparently replevied (set at liberty)
the plaintiff immediately unless it appeared from the defendant's return
that the plaintiff was held upon one of the causes for which a man could
not have this writ or that he was held for some cause for which he was
not "replevisable." Since these two exceptions were very comprehensive
(including, for example, persons held for death of a man, persons taken
by command of the King, and persons held as wards or as villeins), immediate release was doubtless rare. Where the plaintiff was not eligible
for immediate replevin, he or those proceeding in his behalf had to
furnish security (by recognizance in open court) that the plaintiff would
successfully prosecute his action or return to custody if that should be

204 United States v. Bishop, 3 Yeates 37 (Pa. 1800). Cf. Reddill's Case, I Whart. 445
(Pa. 1836) (habeas corpus used to transfer prisoner from one prison to another).
205 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129 (1771). For a discussion of the procedure in
replevin see id. at 146-48.
206 The description in the text is a synthesis of the procedures described in 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129 (1771); Moor v. Watts, 1 Ld. Raym. 613, 615, 88 Eng. Rep.
1426, 1428 (K.B. 1700); Frrz-HERBERT, NATuRA BREvium 152-55 (1775); 1 LuLY, MODERN

ENTRIES 293-94 (5th ed. 1791); Skinner v. Fleet, 14 Johns. R. 263, 264-65, 268-69 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1817).
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adjudged. 20 7 Thereupon a second writ would issue commanding the
sheriff to bring the plaintiff into court notwithstanding the defendant's
return. When the plaintiff was produced he went into the custody of the
marshall of the court unless further security was posted, in which case
the plaintiff was bound to appear in court from day to day until his
case was determined. If the defendant had carried the plaintiff out of
the sheriff's jurisdiction- before the second writ could be served, the
sheriff would return that the plaintiff had been eloigned. Thereupon the
court issued a process called a capias in withernam, upon which the
defendant was immediately imprisoned without bail or mainprize until
he had produced the plaintiff.
The major significance of the common law writ de homine replegiando was that the trial of issues joined was by a jury2O8 instead of by a
court as with the writ of habeas corpus. 2°9 The advantage of a jury trial
to persons who were at a significant disadvantage under the prevailing
law but who could count on the sympathy and support of a predominant
portion of the community was obvious.
210
Owing to the "lengthy and cumbersome nature of the proceedings
on the writ de homine replegiando, it was rarely an effective remedy at
common law, and when Blackstone wrote the first edition of his Com,211
mentaries in 1771 he termed it "almost entirely antiquated ....
Thanks to certain statutory simplifications, however, the writ was soon
resurrected on this side of the Atlantic, and performed an important
function for a time in at least eight states.
The principal statutory reforms of the writ de homine replegiando
date from a 1786 Massachusetts statute,212 which bypassed the multiplicity
of alias and pluries writs necessary to enforce the common law remedy
and made it a "writ of right" for certain classes of plaintiffs: persons held
upon criminal process for a bailable offense, persons held upon most
mesne civil process, and persons held without process. 213 Where a person
207 Actions on this bond were relatively common. The leading case in this country
is probably Covenhoven v. Seaman, 1 Johns. Cas. 23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799), which
contains a summary of the undertakings in the bond.
208 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMEuCAN LAw- 31 (4th ed. 1840).
209 CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS §§ 172-73 (1884).
210 9 HoLnswoRTn, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 121 (1922).
211 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129 (1771).
212 1 MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 58 (1786).
213 The statute excepted persons committed by the executive while the writ of
habeas corpus was suspended by the legislature, and persons committed for treason,
murder, counterfeiting, arson, burglary, robbery or other offense punishable by death
or banishment or persons "held in execution upon judgment of debt, forfeiture,
withernam, or by distress for taxes, or under sentence, after conviction, for fine, costs
or in punishment." 1 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 58, § 1 (1786). In Nason v. Staples, 48 Me.
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in one of these classes applied for the writ and furnished the sheriff with
appropriate bond to ensure his appearance (if held on criminal process)
or gave bond to the defendant (if held upon civil process or without
process) he was delivered immediately upon the sheriff's service of the
writ.214 In contrast, a respondent who was served with a writ of habeas

corpus had three days to bring the prisoner into court to make his return
(ten days if the place of imprisonment was between 20 and 100 miles
from the court, and twenty days if it was more than 100 miles). 215 The
advantage of immediate release, especially to slaves or others in danger
of being eloigned, is apparent. The statutory remedy of course also retained the crucial feature of the jury trial.
The use of the writ de homine replegiando seems to have been relatively widespread. The Massachusetts enactment was copied into the
Maine statutes when that state was carved out of Massachusetts in 1821.216

Although no other states codified their law on this writ, it appears from
court decisions21 7 or from statutes that regulated or abolished its use 218
that the common law writ de homine replegiandowas employed at some
time in at least six other states: Maryland, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.
In Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and especially in Maine, the
writ was apparently very familiar to lawyers. It seems to have been used
123, 128 (1861), the court said the homine replegiando remedy was needless except for
persons held without any process because habeas corpus was so much speedier and so
much less onerous, in consequence of which "there is not a single case reported, in
this State or in Massachusetts, where a person held upon legal process, either civil or
criminal, ever applied for the writ." The cases cited in note 219 infra contradict this
broad statement.
1 MAss. GE.N. LAws ch. 58, § 2 (1786); Nason v. Staples, 48 Me. 123, 127-28 (1861).
E.g., An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for Prevention of Imprisonments Beyond the Seas, 31 Car. 2, c.2 § 2 (1679); 1 MAss. GEN. LAWS
ch. 72, § 3 (1784). Although the language of the statutory writ of habeas corpus followed
the common law form, under which the writ was, in theory, "returnable immediate,"
31 Car. 2, c.2, § 3 (1679), it was held both in England and in the United States that a
return would not be compelled by attachment until after the minimum statutory
periods mentioned above. CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS § 124 (1884); Hua, HABEAs CoRPUs
240 (1858). The pre-statutory practice on this question is set forth in Cohen, supra
note 2, at 189; 4 BACON, ABRHDGEMENT, Habeas Corpus, B13 (question 6th) (Bouvier ed.
1852), summarized in Psi.cE's GA. DiGrsT 1820, p. 569.
216 1 MAINE LAws ch. 66 (1821).
217 See cases cited in notes 219, 222, 224, 231, 235 and 238, infra.
218 1 DoRsEY's MD. LAws 1692-1839, ch. 63, p. 599 (1810) (transfer of actions by
homine replegiando); 2 N.Y. REv. STATs. 1852, p. 792, §§ 13, 15 (person claiming fugitive slave after homine replegiando may be held to bail; penalizes removal of fugitive
after writ granted); New York statute cited note 225 infra; Virginia and Mississippi
statutes cited in note 234 infra.
214
215
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for virtually every purpose for which habeas corpus was employed.2 19 In
the remaining states, as well as in these leading jurisdictions, however,
the major impact of the writ was on the institution of slavery. As with
habeas corpus, the doctrine governing this use of the writ varied from
north to south.
In the North the writ seems to have been available to slaves and
slaveowners on the same basis. Since homine replegiando was the common law remedy for determining whether a person was held in the
servitude of villeinage,22 0 and since there was common law authority for
its use in respect to slaves, 221 it is not surprising that there are cases
demonstrating its use in northern courts by slaveowners to recover their
slaves. 222 As northern opinion was aroused on the slavery question, however, the slaveowner's position was stronger with judges than with
juries, so efforts at recovering runaway slaves typically began (where the
owner needed legal assistance to exert his right to seize the slave) with a
223
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The more common northern usage of the writ de homine replegiando
is suggested by a line of Pennsylvania cases, which demonstrate that this
writ was the conventional means by which an alleged slave in that state
established his right to freedom. 224 Another usage is defined in an 1828
New York act, which provided that an alleged fugitive from labor who
was in custody in that state could bring a writ of homine replegiando
and be released from custody immediately without giving any security
and that all prior proceedings relating to his caption or removal would
219 Nason v. Staples, 48 Me. 123 (1861) (criminal commitment); Garland v. Williams,
49 Me. 16 (1860) (civil arrest); Gurney v. Tufts, 37 Me. 130 (1853) (criminal commitment); Hutchings v. Van Bokkelen, 34 Me. 126 (1852) (soldier-officer); Richardson v.
Richardson, 32 Me. 560, 565 (1851) (child-custody) ('Upon habeas corpus the court
may exercise a discretion in relation to the disposition of a child, which it is unable
to do in this action"); Bridges v. Bridges, 13 Me. 408 (1836) (parent-child); Johnson v.
Medtart, 4 Md. 24 (1815) (soldier-officer); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 102
(1833) (civil arrest); Wood v. Ross, 11 Mass. 271 (1814) (soldier-officer); Williams v.
Blunt, 2 Mass. 207 (1806) (master-apprentice); cases cited in notes 222 and 231 infra.
220 3 HoLDswoTH, HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw 497-98 (3d ed. 1923); case quoted note
181 supra. On villeinage see generally, I COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LIrrLETON §§ 172-212
(Butler ed. 1823); HoswoSRTm, op. cit. supra, at 491-510.
221 4 ComyNs,
DIGFSr, Imprisonment (L4) (5th ed. 1822).
222 See Skinner v. Fleet, 14 Johns. R. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817); Cowperthwaite v.
Jones, 2 Dall. 55 (Pa. C.P. 1790).
223 On the return to the writ the state court held a hearing and issued the certificate
authorized by the Fugitive Slave Law to permit the owner to transport the slave to the
South. Later, exercise of this jurisdiction was prevented by some state laws. See generally, note 193 supra.
224 Alexander v. Stokeley, 7 S. & R. 299 (Pa. 1821); Wilson v. Belinda, 3 S. & R.
396 (Pa. 1817); See Ex parte Lawrence, 5 Binn. 304 (Pa. 1812).
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be suspended until final judgment was given on the homine re225
plegiando.
In Massachusetts, where a homine replegiando statute had been in
effect for fifty years, the writ assumed the unmistakable character of an
anti-slavery remedy through events commencing in 1835. In that year
the legislature abolished the writ de homine replegiando during a statutory revision,22 6 apparently because the writ of habeas corpus was thought
sufficient to answer the purposes of justice. 227 The following year various
petitions praying "the passage of such laws as will secure to those, claimed
as slaves in this Commonwealth, a trial by jury"2 28 were referred to a
legislative committee, which was directed to inquire into the expediency
of restoring the writ de homine replegiando. After a thorough survey of
state power to enact such legislation the committee proposed and the
Massachusetts legislature enacted a bill "to restore the trial by jury, on
questions of personal freedom," which substantially reenacted the old de
homine replegiando statute under the new name "personal replevin.' '22 9
If homine replegiando was available in the circumstance specified in
the New York and Massachusetts statutes and implied in the Pennsylvania litigation, then it could upset the whole course of proceedings
under the Fugitive Slave Act, not only because of the delay involved, but
also because slaveowners or slavecatchers, considering that their prospects
of prevailing in a contest before a northern jury were bleak, would be
inclined to discontinue any efforts at recovery once the replegiando was
granted. The obvious conflict between this state remedy and the objectives of the federal act concerned the Massachusetts lawmakers, but they
concluded that the overriding interest in personal liberty justified exercise of the jurisdiction. 230 The predominant view in the courts, however,
was that state laws could not validly conflict with federal legislation in
this manner. A succession of cases in Pennsylvania and New York held
that homine replegiando was not available for a person who had been
arrested under the provisions of the federal act. 23 1 After the Supreme
225 Act of Dec. 10, 1828, §§ 15-17, 2 N.Y. REv. STATs. 1828, p. 558, 561.
228 MASS. REv. STATs. 1886, ch. 111, § 38.
227 See Trial by Jury in Questions of PersonalFreedom, 17 Am. JUrST 94 (1837).
228 Id. at 94-95.
229 Ibid. Act of Apr. 19, 1837, MASS. GEN. LAws 1886-53 Supp., ch. 221, p. 44.
230 Trial by Jury in Questions of Personal Freedom, 17 AM. JURIsT 94, 97, 112-13

(1837).
2s Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834), aff'd on other grounds, 14
Wend. 507 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1835); Wright v. Deacon, 5 S. & R. 62 (Pa. 1819); In re
Martin, 16 Fed. Cas. 881 (C.CS.D.N.Y. between 1827 and 1840); see McDoucAU.,
FuGrnmv SLAvEs § 44 (1891) (Mass. 1840) (Latimer case, also referred to in Commonwealth v. Tracy, 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 536, 544 (1843)); see generally, 2 KnrNT,
CoMMENTARES 31-33 (4th ed. 1840).
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Court invalidated the Pennsylvania kidnapping penalty on analogous
principles in 1842232 there appear to be no further reports of homine
replegiando being involved in fugitive slave cases.
In the South the writ de homine replegiandowas distinctly unwelcome,
doubtless because of its potential for disrupting the system of slavery.
After initially being used by slaves asserting a right to freedom, 238 the
writ was abolished by statute in Virginia and Mississippi. 284 In Maryland
its use was inhibited by narrow adherence to the common law rule under
which this writ could only be issued by the court of chancery (although
it was returnable in a court of law).23 5 An 1823 decision by a federal
circuit court (Circuit Justice William Johnson) in South Carolina, involving Jamaican sailors imprisoned under a state statute requiring the
seizure and imprisonment of persons of color venturing ashore while
their vessels were in port, threatened to make the writ de homine
replegiando available to slaves. 236 But counsel's vehement protest in that
case against the use of this "obsolete" writ, "raked up from the ashes
of the common law to be now first used against the state of South
Carolina ' 23 7 bore fruit some years later when the state supreme court
extinguished this remedy in an action brought by a group of Negroes
who sought to use it to establish their right to freedom from one who
claimed them as slaves. 238 As it had done in opinions denying similar use
of the writ of habeas corpus, the court rested on the availability of an
alternate legal remedy. Of greater importance, however, was the inappropriateness of de homine replegiando to actions involving the masterservant relationship, since the enforcement machinery "may almost reverse the position, for a time, of master and slave," 23 9 and in any event
would deprive the master of the service of his slave during the period
of litigation. The court gave this explanation:
That the old common law proceeding.is calculated to be extremely mischievous to one who turns out to be really the master, is scarcely denied at the bar, and will be strongly conceived
by him who will consult the particulars of the case of More v.
Watts, in the several books where it appears: for it will be seen
if the claimant fail to give surety, he is to go into the custody
232

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).

233 DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 438, 443 (1886).
-234 Miss. CoMe. STATs. 1802-30, p. 664,

§ 8; VA. Aars 1814, p. 68, § 13.
3 COMYNs, DIGEsr, Imprisonment (1.4)

235 Johnson v. Medtart, 4 Md. 24 (1815);

(5th ed. 1822).
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 491 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
at 497.
238 Huger v. Barnwell, 5 Rich. 273 (S.C. 1852).
289 Id. at 277.

2386

237 Id.
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of the prison keeper. Surely this is not an agreeable result to
the master. So likewise the master is liable to be captured by a
capias in withernam, bailable, to be sure, provided he pleads
"non cepit," but this would be impracticable for one, really
master, who had exercised the right of capturing his slave, and
thus, it is possible, that, under the proceeding chosen in the
present case, an absolute slave might be at large, on bail, and
240
his master in custody.
Only by understanding such quirks in the substantive law can one explain the apparently anomalous fact that the writ of personal replevin,
which treated the petitioner almost as if he were property, was embraced
in the North but rejected in the slaveholding states.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a notable address on the study of law Holmes warned against the
"pitfall of antiquarianism" and declared that "for our purposes our only
interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present." 241 A
survey of the numerous areas in which the writ of habeas corpus was
employed in the state courts and of the multitude of constitutional, statutory and decisional laws governing its use throws some light upon the
present, but the subject areas are so numerous and diverse that the
illumination is kaleidoscopic and faint. Such a survey defies conclusion,
but several features are worthy of final mention.
Few state constitution-makers seem to have been concerned with the
subject of habeas corpus until after article I, section 9 of the federal
constitution was adopted and became a model for subsequent state
provisions. The states were also tardy in enacting habeas corpus legislation. Although most state statutes were patterned after the English
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, their coverage was so diverse that the availability of the writ for many types of restraints-differing from state to
state-remained under the authority of the common law. One of the
most interesting aspects of the state history is the light that it throws on
the contrast between the common law and the statutory writs of habeas
corpus and the substantive law and practice that governed the use of
each.
The history of habeas corpus in criminal cases is of special interest
because of the contemporary importance of this use of the writ. Subjects
of particular revelance include the extent to which the habeas corpus
court's reviewing authority was limited by common law rules or by comparable statutory limitations confining it to defects of "jurisdictional"
240 Ibid.

241 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 474 (1897).
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significance, the possibility that the scope of review varied according to
whether the writ was being issued under statutory authority or pursuant
to the common law, and the asserted inapplicability of the "jurisdiction"
limitation when the issuing court was in effect using a habeas corpus
cum causa to exercise supervisory authority over the committing court. 242
Perhaps more interesting, though less important as a source of illumination for present usages, was the employment of habeas corpus and its
jury-trial counterpart, de homine replegiando, as weapons in the hands
of slaveowners and abolitionists struggling over the custody of alleged
fugitives from labor. The diversity of substantive law that governed use
of these remedies in northern and southern courts provides an example
of the way the law affects and is affected by conditions and needs in
the society it serves.
History contains other examples where habeas corpus was not used to
promote freedom. Although some courts voiced doctrinal objections or
specifically rejected such attempts, there were cases permitting a person
in a variety of circumstances to use the writ to obtain custody of the
nominal petitioner, almost as if he were property whose rightful possession was at issue. In these cases the "writ of liberty" revealed its potential
as an instrument of confinement and oppression.
The final point that rates special mention seems ironic in a period of
protest against federal habeas corpus to relieve state prisoners from the
alleged wrongful conduct of state officers. In the five decades preceding
1865 there are numerous instances where state courts issued their writ
of habeas corpus to release persons from the restraints imposed on their
liberty by the alleged wrongful conduct of federal officers. When that
usage of the writ by state courts was prevented in Ableman v. Booth,
and when Congress enlarged the power of the federal courts to issue
habeas corpus for state prisoners, the relative prominence of state
law on the usages of habeas corpus began its decline.
242 If the rule limiting habeas corpus review to so-called jurisdictional defects did
not apply to writs issued by a court with supervisory authority over the committing
court, the exception could easily engulf the rule in the important area of federal
review of state commitments. On issues of federal law federal courts have "supervisory
authority" over state courts, which they can appropriately exercise by means of their
statutory authority to issue 'the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners.

